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INTRODUCTION 
Although we have been living in the Internet age for more than a dec-
ade now, its implications for copyright law and the fair use doctrine have 
only just begun to manifest.1  By expanding the breadth, diversity and sheer 
 
 
 
*
  Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law.  This Article benefited enormously from 
Justin Hughes‘ extensive and insightful comments and from the diligent editorial assistance of David 
Pekarek Krohn and Gautam Huded.  Thanks also to David Fagundes, Brett Frischmann, Elizabeth 
Townsend Gard, Andrew Gold, Eric Goldman, Bobbi Kwall, Tonja Jacobi, Adam Mossoff, Dotan Oliar, 
Miquel Peguera Poch, Glen Robinson, Mark Schultz, Christopher Sprigman, Rebecca Tushnet and to the 
faculties of DePaul University College of Law and the University of Virginia School of Law.  An earlier 
version of this article was presented at the American Intellectual Property Law Association Annual 
Meeting 2007, the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference 2008, the University of Virginia School of 
Law Faculty Workshop and the DePaul University College of Law Faculty Workshop.  Special thanks to 
the University of Virginia School of Law Library staff and to Adam Cieslak for their invaluable research 
assistance. Please address comments to msag@depaul.edu. 
1
  I use the term Internet age here to refer to the period from 1994 to the present—the period in 
which the Internet was popularized and commercialized.  Technically, the first packet-switching node of 
what would later be called the ARPANET went live on October 29, 1969.  See HILARY W. POOLE ET 
AL., THE INTERNET: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 206 (2005).  The first TCP/IP-wide area network 
was operational by January 1, 1983, when the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) constructed a 
university network backbone that later became the NSFNet.  Id. at 145–46.  
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number of copyrighted works in existence, the Internet has fundamentally 
changed the nature of copyright markets.  This transformation is most sig-
nificant in the context of what I term ―copy-reliant technologies‖—
technologies that copy expressive works for nonexpressive ends.  Copy-
reliant technologies, such as Internet search engines and plagiarism detec-
tion software, do not read, understand, or enjoy copyrighted works, nor do 
they deliver these works directly to the public.  They do, however, necessar-
ily copy them in order to process them as grist for the mill, raw materials 
that feed various algorithms and indices.  
Other scholars have considered separately the copyright implications 
of Internet search engines, plagiarism detection software, reverse engineer-
ing of software, and the recently settled Google Book Project controversy.2  
This Article attempts to provide a unifying theoretical framework for these 
issues, recognizing them as subparts of a broader phenomenon: the emer-
gence of copy-reliant technology. 
Copy-reliant technologies tend to interact with copyrighted works by 
copying them routinely, automatically, and indiscriminately.  These tech-
nologies are vital to the operation of the Internet, but they are vulnerable to 
claims of copyright infringement at key stages of their operation.  Copy-
reliant technologies typically display three significant traits: (1) the copying 
of expressive works for nonexpressive uses, (2) a high volume of transac-
tions, and (3) the use of technologically enabled opt-out mechanisms to re-
duce transaction costs.  The business models that employ these technologies 
often inherently require these traits. 
The rise of copy-reliant technologies exposes seemingly novel ques-
tions.  First, should a nonexpressive use, which nonetheless requires copy-
ing the entirety of a copyrighted work, be found to infringe the exclusive 
rights of the copyright owner?  Our historical intuition is that works are co-
pied to communicate at least some part of the work‘s original expression: 
books are copied to be read, not to serve as paperweights; and compact 
discs are copied to be played, not to function as drink coasters.  This Article 
concludes that because expressive communication to the public implicitly 
defines and limits the extent of the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights, acts 
 
 
 
2
  On search engines, see Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 
8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 201 (2006); James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA 
L. REV. 1 (2007).  On reverse engineering, see Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and 
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).  On plagiarism, see Samuel J. Horovitz, 
Two Wrongs Don‘t Negate A Copyright: Don‘t Make Students Turnitin If You Won‘t Give It Back, 
60 FLA. L. REV. 229 (2008).  On Google Book, see, for example, Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law 
on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799 
(2007); Emily Anne Proskine, Google‘s Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright Analysis of the Google 
Book Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, My Library: Cop-
yright and the Role of Institutions in a Peer-to-Peer World, 53 UCLA L. REV. 977 (2006); Siva Vaid-
hyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and the Future of Copyright, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207 
(2007). 
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of copying that do not communicate the author‘s original expression to the 
public do not generally constitute copyright infringement. 
The second important question raised by copy-reliant technologies re-
lates to the opt-out mechanisms built into many copy-reliant technologies.  
The architects of these technologies have chosen to build in these mechan-
isms to preserve the autonomy of the copyright owner.  These mechanisms, 
however, switch the default position from ―no copying without permission‖ 
to one in which copyright owners must affirmatively opt out of specific 
uses of their works.  Accordingly, we face the question of whether this 
modification of the usual copyright default is justified from either a doctrin-
al or a utilitarian perspective. 
The challenge presented by copy-reliant technology inevitably interacts 
with the issue of fair use.  Technically, the fair use doctrine renders certain 
otherwise infringing actions relating to copyrighted works noninfringing.3  
More generally, fair use allows the use of copyrighted works without per-
mission; as such, it performs a vital function in the modern copyright sys-
tem by establishing limits on the otherwise expansive rights of copyright 
owners.4  Because of the fair use doctrine‘s pivotal role in adapting copy-
right law to new technology, any examination of copyright and new tech-
nology inevitably becomes a reflection on the nature of fair use.  This 
Article explains the correct application of the fair use doctrine in the context 
of nonexpressive uses.  Furthermore, this Article explores the application of 
fair use in situations where the alleged infringer has provided copyright 
owners with the ability to opt out. 
Part I of this Article introduces the phenomenon of copy-reliant tech-
nology by focusing on four significant case studies.  The first case study, 
Field v. Google Inc., centers on the permissibility of automated archiving in 
the context of text-based search engines.5  The second case study, Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., centers on the creation and display of thumb-
nail representations of copyrighted photographs by image-based search en-
gines.6  The conduct challenged in the third case study, the Google Book 
Project, relates both to the generation of metadata and to the display of 
fragments of books as part of a menu of search results.7  The final case 
study looks at plagiarism detection software, which also addresses the use 
 
 
 
3
  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (―[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copy-
right.‖).  
4
  As I have argued elsewhere, this function actually allows copyright owners a broader set of exclu-
sive rights than would otherwise be possible.  Matthew Sag, God in the Machine, A New Structural 
Analysis of Copyright‘s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 381 (2005). 
5
  412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006); see infra Part I.B.1. 
6
  487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); see infra Part I.B.2. 
7
  Class Action Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google, No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005); 
see infra Part I.B.3. 
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of copyrighted works to generate metadata.8  These case studies illustrate 
copy-reliant technology in a number of contexts that are further developed 
in Parts II and III.   
Part II explores the doctrinal implications of the nonexpressive use of 
copyrighted works.  Traditionally, copyright owners have been able to con-
trol significant communicative or expressive uses of their works—such as 
reproduction, display and performance.  In contrast, copy-reliant technolo-
gies typically use copyrighted works in a way that is noncommunicative 
and nonexpressive.  A careful review of existing copyright doctrine sug-
gests that the rights of copyright owners do not typically encompass nonex-
pressive uses of their works.  I argue that recognizing a principle of 
nonexpressive use resolves many questions relating to copy-reliant technol-
ogies.  It also reconciles many puzzling features of the fair use doctrine 
more broadly.  Part II concludes by addressing the doctrinal incorporation 
of this principle of nonexpressive use through the application of the fair use 
doctrine. 
Part III studies the doctrinal implications of high transaction costs in 
relation to copy-reliant technologies and the use of opt-out mechanisms to 
mitigate those transaction costs.  It then analyzes the relationship between 
transaction costs and the form and content of property rights generally, and 
the relevance of opt-outs to a fair use analysis. 
I. COPY-RELIANT TECHNOLOGIES AND THE INTERNET 
This Part begins, in section A, with a general discussion of the link be-
tween the technological and social changes of the Internet era and the evo-
lution of copyright law.  It also explains the centrality of the fair use 
doctrine in recalibrating copyright law as technology and market conditions 
change.  This framework forms the essential theoretical background for un-
derstanding the significance of the copy-reliant technology.  Section B de-
scribes four case studies of copy-reliant technology that serve to illustrate 
the concept and its application.  These case studies are the empirical back-
bone of this Article; they are introduced in this Part and further developed 
in Parts II and III.  As the case studies illustrate, copy-reliant technologies 
tend to raise certain recurring legal issues: the copying of expressive works 
for nonexpressive uses, the potential for high transaction costs, and the role 
of opt-out mechanisms in addressing these transaction cost problems.9   
 
 
 
8
  A.V. v. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008); see infra Part I.B.4.  Space constraints 
preclude additional case studies covering areas such as software reverse engineering.  
9
  See infra Parts II and III for the further development of these issues. 
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A. New Technologies, Copyright Markets, and Copyright Law 
From the printing press to the photocopier, from the piano-roll to the 
mp3 player, new technologies have fundamentally altered copyright law.10  
Photography, motion pictures, sound recording, and broadcasting have each 
demanded and (eventually) received accommodation from copyright law.11  
As the technologies of reproduction and communication change, they create 
new vehicles of creative expression, new communities of interest, and ex-
pose latent ambiguities within existing doctrines.12  
In some respects, the new technologies of copying and distribution that 
form the Internet represent a continuation of this trend.  Napster‘s peer-to-
peer file sharing technology (or more recently, BitTorrent) exemplifies how 
digital technology and online distribution allow users to copy and distribute 
existing works, such as sound recording and motion pictures, at virtually no 
cost.13  Unlocking content from physical delivery has facilitated more than 
just piracy; it has also enabled legal digital music services that have made 
more music available at a lower cost than ever before.14  
Advances in technology have also opened up new possibilities of crea-
tive production by reducing the cost of sound and video editing.  The type 
of video editing software used to create the Phantom Edit15—a fan edited 
version of Star Wars Episode I without the much-reviled Jar Jar Binks cha-
racter—used to be reserved for Hollywood studios alone; it is now widely 
available for less than the cost of a new television.16  These new possibilities 
have done more than simply lower costs for existing producers; they have 
introduced new participants and in some cases dramatically changed the 
 
 
 
10
  See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT‘S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX (2003) (tracing the development of copyright law in the United States); JESSICA LITMAN, 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (tracing the history of copyright legislation in the United States); Peter Me-
nell, Envisioning Copyright Law‘s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (2002) (arguing that the 
digital revolution represents a third distinct wave of technological innovation that portends significant 
changes in copyright protection). 
11
  See generally LITMAN, supra note 10 (discussing the legislative history of U.S. copyright law in 
the twentieth century).  
12
  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, 22–23 (1999); WILLIAM 
LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).  
13
  See generally Matthew Helton, Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement: BitTorrent as a 
Vehicle for Establishing a New Copyright Definition for Staple Articles of Commerce, 40 COLUM. J. L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 1 (2006) (explaining the technological and legal implications of the nearly costless repli-
cation of copyrighted data). 
14
  See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL 139 (2006) (noting the effect on price). 
15
  See Amy Harmon, ‗Star Wars‘ Fan Films Come Tumbling Back to Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
2002, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 28 (discussing STAR WARS EPISODE 1.1: THE PHANTOM EDIT (2001), and 
its creation).  
16
  See Wikipedia, List of Video Editing Software, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_video 
_editing _software (last visited July 27, 2009), for a list of video editing software, including several free 
and open source modules.  
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medium.  The disruptive effect of political blogs on the agenda-setting 
power of newspapers and television reporting is just one example.17  
To regard these changes, and their implications for copyright law, as a 
mere continuation of past technological changes would risk overlooking a 
crucial transformation.18  Digital technology and the Internet have signifi-
cantly expanded the scope, diversity, and number of copyrighted works in 
existence.  The cost of reproducing and disseminating digital works has not 
merely fallen; in many cases it has become entirely negligible.  Thus, the 
Internet has not merely induced an increase in copying, but an exponential 
increase.  This is not just a difference in degree, but a difference in kind.19  
Similarly, copyright policy in the Internet age requires more than the inclu-
sion of one or two neglected interest groups; copyright law now reaches 
deep inside the home and must take account of a much broader set of stake-
holders than ever before.20  The proliferation of copyrighted works in the In-
ternet age is not simply a question of scale; the Internet has radically 
decentralized the production of information and expressive works, such that 
the producers of publicly available copyrighted works are now more nu-
merous and more diverse than at any time in human history. 
The magnitude of these changes does not automatically suggest that 
copyright has no application online, or that we should discard the substan-
tial body of copyright law that has developed over the past two centuries.  
To the contrary, many of the principles and distinctions derived from pre-
Internet cases are equally applicable online.  Often, the mere fact that copy-
ing took place online is of little or no relevance.  For example, the legality 
of the 655,000 self-described parody videos hosted on YouTube21 largely 
depends on the amount of copyrighted material taken by the parodist,22 and 
on whether courts reasonably perceive the work as a genuine parody of the 
 
 
 
17
  See Kevin Wallsten, Agenda Setting and the Blogosphere: An Analysis of the Relationship Be-
tween Mainstream Media and Political Blogs, 24 REV. POL‘Y RES. 567, 567–87 (2007) (finding a com-
plex, bidirectional relationship between mainstream media coverage and blog discussion rather than a 
unidirectional media or blog agenda-setting effect); see also Stephen A. Banning & Kaye D. Sweetser, 
How Much Do They Think It Affects Them and Whom Do They Believe?: Comparing the Third-Person 
Effect and Credibility of Blogs and Traditional Media, 55 COMM. Q. 451, 451–66 (2007) (finding no 
observable differences between the credibility of blogs and that of more traditional media). 
18
  See Menell, supra note 10, at 64 (discussing the relationship between new technology and new 
modes of expression). 
19
  P.W. Anderson, More Is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of the Hierarchical Struc-
ture of Science, 177 (4047) SCIENCE 393 (1972). 
20
  See LITMAN, supra note 10.  
21
  This figure is based on a YouTube.com search for the term parody, http://www.youtube.com/ 
results?search_type=&search_query=parody&aq=f (search performed July 1, 2009).  
22
  Berlin v. E.C. Publ‘ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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copyright owner‘s work.23  These considerations are the same today as they 
were in 1994, when the Supreme Court last addressed the issue.24  
However, this apparent continuity should not blind us to significant 
underlying changes.  The advent of discussion boards, blogs, social net-
working sites, photo-sharing sites, and other user-generated content has 
made the fair use doctrine more important to more people than ever before.  
The fair use doctrine has become increasingly significant to the general 
public because digital technology and the Internet have enabled new forums 
and new ways to interact with copyrighted material, often by copying por-
tions of it.25  For example, while cutting out an article from a newspaper and 
sending it to a friend through the U.S. postal service does not implicate 
copyright, posting the contents of the same article on an Internet discussion 
board or blog necessitates copying and thus raises the specter of copyright 
infringement.  The fair use doctrine has also become more important to the 
public as the sharing of user-generated content online enables copyright 
owners to detect infringement more easily.26  The scope of fair use in rela-
tion to YouTube videos, blogs, and other forms of user-generated content is 
an important issue, but outside the scope of this Article.  Instead, this Ar-
ticle explores a different set of issues that augurs a more fundamental 
change in the way we think about copyright and fair use.  Indeed, this Ar-
ticle seeks to refocus the copyright debate, shifting it away from the peren-
nial concern about freedom of expression and onto the important topic of 
nonexpressive use.27  Specifically, this Article addresses the operation of 
copyright law in relation to copy-reliant technologies, such as Internet 
search engines, electronic archives, plagiarism detection software, and other 
applications that rely on copying expressive works for nonexpressive ends. 
These technological changes are significant for copyright because by 
enabling more people to produce a greater range of copyrighted material, 
the Internet has fundamentally changed the nature of copyright markets.  To 
appreciate the significance of these changes for copyright law, it is first ne-
cessary to examine the economic function of copyright.  
Copyright creates exclusive rights in certain forms of expression to 
give authors an incentive to create those works in the first place.28  Howev-
er, these same exclusive rights raise the cost for consumers to acquire those 
works, and for subsequent authors to create further expressive works.  In 
 
 
 
23
  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also SunTrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 
F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997). 
24
  Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
25
  See L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2000).  
26
  See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 
1537–39 (2005). 
27
  See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 42 (2001). 
28
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1614 
the world of tangible objects, these costs become price signals that ensure 
the efficient allocation of goods to those who value them most.  Given, 
however, that expressive works can be consumed again and again by differ-
ent people without diminishing their value, the exclusive rights established 
by copyright also result in some deadweight loss because those who are 
unwilling to pay the higher price are forced to go without the work in ques-
tion.29  
The author‘s exclusive rights under copyright law provide a buffer 
against price competition.  This buffer to competition allows the author to 
charge higher prices than she otherwise could, which in turn has two imme-
diate effects.  First, some consumers remain willing to purchase the work at 
a higher price and consequently pay more.  Assuming we value the welfare 
of both consumers and authors equally, this is simply a wealth transfer and 
is welfare neutral.  Second, it forces those who are unwilling to pay the 
higher price to go without the work in question.30  Market allocation of 
scarce resources to their highest valued use is usually welfare enhancing, 
but for nonrivalrous goods, the exclusion of low-value users produces a 
deadweight loss because their consumption is not at the expense of another 
who values the good more.31  
That copyright requires a balance between ―the interests of authors and 
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on 
the one hand, and society‘s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, in-
formation, and commerce on the other hand‖ has long been understood.32  
What is sometimes less clearly grasped is that where this balance should be 
struck depends not just on the relative needs of authors and consumers, but 
also on how effectively we expect those parties to cooperate and compro-
mise.33  In many situations, authors can license their creations with relative 
ease and the theoretical loss of exclusion is minimal.34  In other situations, 
however, copyright markets do not function so smoothly.  Sometimes copy-
right owners ―wield their economic control with the deftness of a surgeon‘s 
scalpel,‖35 while other times it is more like a cudgel.  For example, Stephen 
Joyce has been accused of attempting to control access to unpublished ma-
 
 
 
29
  For a more detailed discussion of the economics of copyright, see Matthew Sag, Beyond Abstrac-
tion: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
30
  This assumes, realistically, the absence of perfect price discrimination.  See generally Kathleen 
Carroll & Dennis Coates, Teaching Price Discrimination: Some Clarification, 66 S. ECON. J. 466, 471–
78 (1999) (noting that the assumption that price discrimination is efficient is often implausible). 
31
  See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11–23 (2004) (de-
scribing the effect of exclusion on resource allocation). 
32
  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
33
  See Sag, supra note 29, at 208–15 (discussing the relationship between copyright scope and the 
effectiveness of private ordering). 
34
  See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing product differentiation through versioning in the 
book publishing and motion picture industries). 
35
  Id. 
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terial in order to influence historical and literary conceptions of his grandfa-
ther, James Joyce, whose literary estate he controls.36  The Joyce estate‘s 
threats of copyright litigation forced one Joyce biographer to file for a dec-
laratory judgment that her academic book and proposed electronic supple-
ment did not infringe copyright.37  Biographers of Howard Hughes have 
faced similar difficulties.38  
Copyright law addresses potential market malfunctions in a number of 
ways.  Doctrines such as the idea–expression distinction protect the expres-
sive elements of the author‘s work while guaranteeing subsequent authors 
the necessary breathing space to make their own contributions by adding to, 
reusing, or reinterpreting the facts and ideas embodied in the original 
work.39  Statutory exemptions and compulsory licenses—such as the special 
reproduction rights of libraries and archives,40 and the compulsory license 
for making and distributing audio recordings41—also provide some breath-
ing space.  Their scope, however, tends to be limited.  The primary way in 
which copyright law adjusts to potential market malfunctions is through the 
evolution of the mercurial doctrine of fair use.  
Fair use is a flexible standard that limits the scope of copyright protec-
tion and renders certain actions relating to copyrighted works noninfring-
ing.42  Activities that courts have regarded as fair use that may have 
otherwise been infringing include: quoting a significant portion of a work 
for the purpose of criticism, illustration, comment, or clarification; parody-
ing a work; and copying part of a work in the course of classroom activi-
ties.43  Judges and legal scholars frequently attest to the importance of the 
fair use doctrine,44 but in spite of its partial codification in the Copyright 
Act of 1976, the exact nature of fair use remains elusive and resists 
straightforward definition.45  
 
 
 
36
  See Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007); R. Anthony Reese, Public but 
Private: Copyright‘s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85 TEX. L. REV. 585, 618 (2007); see also D.T. 
Max, The Injustice Collector, NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 34–43 (providing an account of Stephen 
Joyce‘s various threats of copyright litigation). 
37
  Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083.  
38
  Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). 
39
  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also Warner 
Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (describing the idea–expression dis-
tinction as ―an effort to enable courts to adjust the tension between these competing effects of copyright 
protection‖). 
40
  17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2006). 
41
  17 U.S.C. § 115. 
42
  17 U.S.C. § 107.   
43
  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL 
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (1961). 
44
  See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ‘ns. Int‘l., Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (noting 
that fair use doctrine plays an essential role in copyright law). 
45
  See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (describing fair use as one 
of the most troublesome doctrines in the entire law of copyright). 
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Fair use allows the use of copyrighted works without permission.  As 
such, it performs a vital function in the modern copyright system by estab-
lishing limits on the otherwise expansive rights of copyright owners.  Fair 
use is necessary, in part, because licensing and other private ordering me-
chanisms do not provide a solution for cases involving high transaction 
costs, strategic holdouts, and inadvertent copying.46  The fair use doctrine is 
particularly important in situations where the costs of obtaining permission 
outweigh the benefits of the use.  The doctrine also plays a mediating role 
in situations where the copyright owner withholds permission for reasons 
that society finds unacceptable.  For example, a copyright owner usually 
cannot deny permission to copy in order to stifle parody, criticism, or social 
debate.47  
B. Four Case Studies of Copy-Reliant Technology  
Much of the discussion that follows concentrates on various forms of 
search technology as a compelling illustration of the issues that apply to 
copy-reliant technologies more generally: the copying of expressive works 
for nonexpressive uses, the potential for high transaction costs, and the role 
of opt-out mechanisms in addressing these transaction costs problems.  
Search technology is clearly a significant public policy issue.48  The In-
ternet has become integral to modern existence.  For many, it is the domi-
nant medium of communication, research, entertainment, social interaction, 
and political participation.49  Search technology drives the Internet.50  With-
out reliable search technology, the world‘s 1.7 billion Internet users51 would 
have very little hope of finding what they were looking for among the hun-
dreds of billions of individual web pages comprising the World Wide 
Web.52  Search engines allow users to sift through massive amounts of data 
to find the specific information that is of particular interest to them.  The In-
 
 
 
46
  See Sag, supra note 29, at 250 (criticizing doctrinal recommendations which aim to optimize 
copyright scope in the abstract but do not account for the uncertain effects or strategic behavior); see 
also Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (dis-
cussing the necessity of fair use). 
47
  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also SunTrust Bank v. Hough-
ton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
48
  Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines Mat-
ters, 16 INFO. SOC‘Y 169 (2000).  
49
  See Press Release, Pew Res. Ctr., Social Networking and Online Videos Take Off, Internet‘s 
Broader Role in Campaign 2008 (Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/384.pdf 
(summarizing survey data). 
50
  Following common usage, references herein to the Internet encompass both the physical layer 
and the content layer.  See Robert E. Kahn & Vinton G. Cerf, What Is the Internet (And What Makes It 
Work), CORP. FOR NAT‘L RES. INITIATIVES (Dec. 1999), available at http://www.cnri.reston.va.us/ 
what_is_internet.html.  
51
  Internet World Stats, World Internet Usage and Population Statistics,  http://www.Internetworld 
stats.com/stats.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). 
52
  See infra note 275 and accompanying text. 
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ternet would function very differently and much less efficiently without 
search engines.53  Indeed, users might not find a great deal of content on the 
Internet without search engines, which begs the question of whether anyone 
would have the incentive to create or post content in the first place.54 
Internet search engines typify copy-reliant technology in that they re-
quire the routine and indiscriminate copying of expressive works for non-
expressive purposes.  Search engines copy expressive works in order to 
apply certain mathematical functions to their contents, they do not compre-
hend or enjoy copyrighted works in the way that humans do—they simply 
process them as raw materials that feed various algorithms and indices.  Au-
tomated software agents of the search engines continuously ―crawl‖ across 
the Internet copying web pages.  These copies form the raw data underpin-
ning these search engines, which is later analyzed and cataloged.55  As part 
of this process, search engines both copy and index each web page they 
find.  They then store the HTML code from those pages in a temporary re-
pository called a cache.56  
Search engines direct users to particular websites based on the relation-
ship of their search term to the index of pages maintained by the search en-
gine provider.57  Typically, search engines display search results in a list 
that features both the title of the relevant web page and a short ―snippet‖ or 
extract from the targeted web page.  In the popular Google search engine, 
two hyperlinks follow the snippet.  One goes to the actual web page, and 
the other goes to the cached version of the page stored on the provider‘s 
servers.  Thus, search engines must copy web pages to generate the data 
that allows them to process search requests.  They also must copy web pag-
es in order to display fragments of them as search results.  The centrality of 
copying to these routine functions leaves search engines vulnerable to 
 
 
 
53
  Web directories which list websites by category and subcategory offer an alternative to search 
engines.  However, general directories require an elaborate system of categorization that tends to ossify 
and become redundant as the context for information retrieval and the relevance of existing information 
changes.   
54
  Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 48; see generally JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW 
GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE (2005) 
(providing an account of the history and significance of Internet search).  
55
  It is important for the discussion that follows to note that caching (i.e., copying web pages) is dis-
tinct from, and precedes, indexing.  See Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale 
Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 30 COMPUTER NETWORKS AND ISDN SYSTEMS 107 (1998), available 
at http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html. 
56
  The three most popular search engines are currently Google, Yahoo!, and MSN.  Each of these 
displays ―cached‖ links with their search results.  See Enid Burns, U.S. Search Engine Rankings, De-
cember 2007, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, Feb. 5, 2008, http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage 
.html?page=3628341 (estimating Google‘s market share at 58.4 percent, Yahoo!‘s at 22.9 percent, and 
Microsoft‘s at 9.8 percent) (last visited Aug. 12, 2009). 
57
  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998) (―Method for Node Ranking in a Linked 
Database.‖). 
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claims of copyright infringement.  Whether these claims are spurious or 
well founded is the central topic of this Article.  
The four case studies that follow provide a brief illustration of the vul-
nerability of copy-reliant technologies and their associated business models 
to claims of copyright infringement.  The sections that follow briefly de-
scribe these cases.  The remainder of this Article then explores them in 
more detail.  
1. Archiving Copyrighted Works: Field v. Google Inc.—In 2006, Bl- 
ake Field, a Las Vegas personal injury attorney, sued the Internet search 
giant Google for copyright infringement.58  The basis of Field‘s claim was 
that Google had infringed his rights by allowing Internet users to access 
copies of his copyrighted works stored by Google‘s search engine cache.59  
Search engines allow users to retrieve items from the cache for two 
main reasons.  First, cached links enable Internet users to detect changes 
that have been made to a particular web page.60  The differences such com-
parisons reveal can have important political, educational, and legal ramifi-
cations.61  Second, the availability of cached links enables users to 
understand why the search engine returned a seemingly irrelevant web page 
in response to their query.  Although these functions relate to the copy-
righted expression contained in the original website, they do not replicate 
the expressive function of the original.  By definition, the use of a cached 
version of a web page to detect changes is a use that the original copy-
righted work could not serve alone.62  Likewise, referring to the cache to 
understand better the relationship between a particular page and a particular 
search term is also a use that the original copyrighted work could not serve 
alone.63   
 
 
 
58
  See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
59
  Id. at 1115. 
60
  Id. at 1112 (noting that by examining Google‘s copy of the page, people can identify subtle but 
potentially significant differences between the current and cached versions of a page).  
61
  See generally Matthew Fagan, ―Can You Do a Wayback on That?‖ The Legal Community‘s Use 
of Cached Web Pages In and Out of Trial, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 46 (2007) (exploring the implica-
tions of web caching for the legal community); see also infra note 63. 
62
  Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.  
63
  The Internet Archive is also subject to a similar set of copyright issues.  The Internet Archive, 
http://archive.org, has amassed a collection of over 85 billion screenshots of web pages which are stored 
on a computer database in California.  These web pages are available at no cost to the public via the 
―Wayback Machine.‖  Similar to an Internet search engine, the Internet Archive uses a web crawler to 
routinely take snapshots of websites as they exist on various days.  The Wayback Machine does not di-
rect a user to a live website; instead, it presents the user with a static archived version of the website re-
trieved from the Internet Archive‘s database.  The Wayback Machine is an invaluable tool for 
researchers, historians, and, increasingly, litigators, because it provides a record of the contents of a 
website that is independent of the website‘s author.  See, e.g., Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, 
Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 629 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that viewing and printing 
archived web pages retrieved from the Wayback Machine was fair use). 
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Although not expressed in this terminology, the essence of the trial 
court‘s finding in Field was that the nonexpressive use of the works in the 
cache did not interfere with the rights accorded to Field as an author.64  
Field‘s apparent ability to opt out of inclusion in the Google search engine 
also impacted the court‘s decision.65  The significance of both of these ra-
tionales will be addressed below.66  
2. Displaying Search Results: Perfect 10 v. Amazon.—Google‘s sea- 
rch engine technology was also at the core of another recent case, Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.67  Perfect 10 produces and sells copyrighted 
images of nude models.68  It does so primarily through a subscription web-
site.69  The material on Perfect 10‘s own website is neither indexed nor 
cached by the Google search engine; however, the search engine has no 
mechanism to exclude images republished by third parties without Perfect 
10‘s authorization.70  
To comprehend Perfect 10‘s objection to Google‘s image search en-
gine, it is first necessary to understand how image-based search technology 
differs from conventional text-based search technology.  Instead of recog-
nizing images themselves, image search software identifies text associated 
with objects identified as images.  If the text associated with an image file is 
responsive to a user‘s search query, the search engine will display a small 
lower resolution ―thumbnail‖ of the image in the search results.  If an Inter-
net user selects that thumbnail, the browser takes the user to the original lo-
cation to retrieve the full-scale image.71  One of Perfect 10‘s several theories 
of liability was that by producing these thumbnail representations, Google 
was improperly copying Perfect 10‘s work without its authorization.72  The 
district court agreed with Perfect 10 on this theory of infringement.  How-
ever, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the use of thumb-
nail representations in an image-based search engine did not constitute 
copyright infringement.73  The essence of the court‘s reasoning—that 
Google‘s use of thumbnails ―served a different function‖ unrelated to ―artis-
tic expression‖—is consistent with the nonexpressive use paradigm ad-
vanced in this Article.74  
 
 
 
64
  412 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. 
65
  Id. 
66
  See infra Parts II and III. 
67
  487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). 
68
  Id. at 710. 
69
  Id. 
70
  Id. at 711. 
71
  Id. 
72
  Id. 
73
  Id. 
74
  Id. at 721 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 
336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that thumbnails are transformative).  
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3. Generating Metadata: The Google Book Project.—Google‘s self-
appointed mission ―to organize the world‘s information and make it univer-
sally accessible and useful‖ is not limited to that which is already in digital 
form.75  Likened to the Library of Alexandria,76 the Google Book Search Li-
brary Project (Google Book) aims to make the contents of over nine million 
books—the entire catalog of some of the world‘s most prestigious and ex-
tensive libraries—searchable by anyone with an Internet connection.77  To 
create this search index, Google is currently in the process of digitizing vast 
collections of books, one page at a time.  
Google Book allows users to search inside the text of captured books 
and to generate a list of books relevant to the user‘s search terms.78  Google 
does not allow users to access the entire contents of any book, nor even an 
entire page of any book, unless the book is known to be in the public do-
main or the copyright owner has expressly agreed to such access.79  In the 
default scenario—where Google has not received permission and the book 
does not appear to be in the public domain—Google Book presents a user 
who clicks on a book title with bibliographic data about the target book and 
a small extract or ―snippet‖ of the relevant page containing her search 
terms.80  It also presents users with additional information about the books 
targeted by their search term, including links to online bookstores and links 
to nearby libraries where the user can obtain the book.81  
 
 
 
75
  Google Corporate Information: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate (last vi-
sited Apr. 7, 2009).  
76
  Brewster Kahle, Speech to the Library of Congress in the Digital Future Series (Dec. 13, 2004), 
available at http://www.archive.org/details/cspan_brewster_kahle. 
77
  Bob Thompson, Search Me?; Google Wants to Digitize Every Book.  Publishers Say Read the 
Fine Print First, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2006, at D1.  
78
  Answer, Jury Demand, and affirmative defenses of defendant Google Inc. ¶ 19, Authors Guild v. 
Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2005); Answer, Jury Demand, and affirmative de-
fenses of defendant Google Inc. ¶ 4, McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc. No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 8, 2005).  Unless otherwise stated, discussion of the Google Book project in this Article does not 
take into account the substantial changes envisaged under the revised class action settlement.  At the 
time this Article went to press, the settlement had yet to be finally approved by the district court.  The 
proposed settlement is available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/. 
79
  Answer, Jury Demand, and affirmative defenses of defendant Google Inc. ¶ 4, McGraw-Hill Cos., 
Inc. v. Google Inc. No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2005).  Google has several agreements with pub-
lishers to do just that.  See Complaint ¶ 30, 31, McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc. No. 05-CV-8881 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005); Answer, Jury Demand, and affirmative defenses of defendant Google Inc. 
¶ 30, McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc. No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2005).  Amazon.com‘s 
Search Inside feature also offers similar functionality for the much smaller collection of works for which 
Amazon.com has been able to obtain permission from the relevant publishers.  See Amazon.com‘s Res-
ponses And Objections To Subpoena Served By Google Inc., McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc. and 
Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 and No. 05-CV–8881 (W.D.Wash. Oct. 20, 2006). 
80
  Google, What You‘ll See When You Search on Google Book Search, http://books.google.com/ 
googlebooks/screenshots.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2009). 
81
  Id. 
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Google Book‘s potential benefits to researchers are easily demonstrat-
ed.  It takes just three clicks to go from the initial Google Book search 
screen to the call number of a specific and useful book in the University of 
Virginia Law library.  For example, one might search for a basic statistical 
textbook discussing the limits of accepting the null hypothesis by entering 
the search term ―accepting the null hypothesis.‖82  Entering the search term 
generates a menu of books containing the term.  Selecting any one book 
leads to a fuller set of information about the book, including snippets from 
the digitized book illustrating the relevance of the search term to the con-
tents of the book, bibliographic information, links to reviews, links to refer-
ences from web pages, links to references from other books, and details of 
other editions.  
 
Figure 1: Example of a Google Book ―Snippet‖ 
 
The same screen also contains a menu of location options allowing the 
user to buy the book from online retailers, such as Amazon.com and Barnes 
& Noble, or to find the book in a lending library.  A second click generates 
a list of libraries ranked in order of geographic proximity.  A third click ac-
tually retrieves the call number from, for instance, the University of Virgin-
ia Law Library.83  In this fashion, Google Book allows users to sort vast 
volumes of information according to relevance and accessibility.  Google 
Book will also provide information about books that are out of print or oth-
erwise inaccessible to most of the public.84  It might be hyperbolic to sug-
gest that ―all the books in the world [will] become a single liquid fabric of 
interconnected words and ideas,‖85 but perhaps great advances in human 
knowledge deserve a little hyperbole.  
Not everyone is so enamored.  Google has recently settled two signifi-
cant lawsuits in relation to Google Book.86  The first is by the American As-
 
 
 
82
  Search conducted by the author on April 7, 2009 using the Google Book search engine at 
http://books.google.com.  
83
  The book located in this example was Science and Behavior: An Introduction to Methods of Re-
search, which contains a useful discussion of the problem of accepting the null hypothesis at page 149.  
JOHN M. NEALE & ROBERT M. LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS OF 
RESEARCH 149 (2d ed. 1980).  
84
  See Edward Wyatt, Google Adds Library Texts to Search Database, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at 
C11. 
85
  Kevin Kelly, Scan This Book!, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, §6 (Magazine), at 42. 
86
  See supra note 78.  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1622 
sociation of University Presses.87  The second is a class action representing 
published authors and The Authors Guild.88  Both suits sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief and money damages.  The copyright challenge to 
Google Book focused primarily on the way Google is building its search 
engine, rather than the output of the search engine per se.89  The information 
contained in the search results of any one Google Book search is not, by it-
self, likely to infringe the copyright of any author for two reasons.  First, 
most of the information Google Book generates falls into the category of 
facts about books, which are not protectable by copyright.90  Second, even 
the snippets of material that Google directly copies from the print version of 
a book will not amount to copyright infringement because the amounts tak-
en are too fragmented and insignificant to constitute a substantial reproduc-
tion of the original work.91  
However, the manner in which Google is building its formidable data-
base presents more serious copyright issues.  In the same way that Internet 
search engines routinely, automatically, and indiscriminately copy web 
pages as part of the indexing process, the Google Book project requires the 
routine, automatic, and indiscriminate copying of printed library books 
whether they are likely to be protected by copyright or not.  Like the other 
search engine case studies above, Google does not copy these literary works 
to disseminate a substantive amount of their expressive content to the pub-
lic, but rather as grist for the search engine mill.  Google Book is consistent 
with the first two case studies in another important way: just like with its 
other search engines, Google has provided a method by which authors who 
do not want to have their works included in Google Book have the ability to 
opt out.92  The implications of both of these features are discussed in more 
detail in Parts II and III. 
 
 
 
87
  The Association of American University Publishers on behalf of the McGraw-Hill Companies, 
Pearson Education, Penguin Group (USA), Simon & Schuster, and John Wiley & Sons, also filed suit 
against Google on October 19, 2005.  See McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc., Civil Action No. 05-
CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005).  
88
  The Authors Guild filed a lawsuit in relation to Google‘s scanning and digitizing of library books 
on September 20, 2005.  See Class Action Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005). 
89
  Admittedly, the Authors Guild‘s Class Action Compliant is not so precise.  See First Amended 
Class Action Compliant ¶¶ 3–4, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 
2006). 
90
  See infra Part II.B. 
91
  See infra Part II.B.  This may not be so with respect to poetry, dictionaries, drug reference guides, 
price guides, and books of quotations.  Google intends to provide snippet previews of such works only 
with authorization from the rightsholder.  See Google, Google Book Settlement, http://www.googlebook 
settlement.com/help/bin/answer.py?answer=118722 (last visited Aug. 4, 2009).   
92
  The mechanics of the opt-out mechanism have been considerably refined in the proposed Google 
Book Settlement.  See Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual (July 
22, 2009) (working paper), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437812. 
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4. Turnitin.com: Plagiarism Detection Software.—Several different 
types of educational institutions have turned to technological solutions to 
combat the threat of plagiarism.93  Harvard University,94 the International 
Baccalaureate program,95 and thousands of high schools across the United 
States96 use plagiarism detection software to detect and deter cheating by 
their students.  Plagiarism detection services, such as those available at 
Turnitin.com, detect improper and unaccredited copying in student papers 
by comparing new papers to an archive of material available on the Internet 
and to proprietary databases of previously submitted papers.97  
This technology has obvious benefits for educators and for students.  
However, like other copy-reliant technologies, antiplagiarism software also 
has its share of critics.98  In 2006, students at McLean High School in Vir-
ginia objected when the school mandated the compulsory use of antiplagiar-
ism software.99  The students took umbrage to both the implied accusation 
of cheating and to the fact that a commercial software company would be 
able to make use of their works by adding them to a reference database.100  
Two McLean High School students followed up their protest with a copy-
right infringement lawsuit against iParadigms, the company that provides 
the Turnitin.com service.101  The students sought a total of $900,000 in 
damages based on alleged copyright infringement of six term papers.  At 
least one of the papers contained an express instruction that it was not to be 
archived.102  Some other plagiarism detection services avoid similar disputes 
by allowing students to opt out of inclusion in their reference databases.  
 
 
 
93
  Darby Dickerson, Facilitated Plagiarism: The Saga of Term-Paper Mills and the Failure of Leg-
islation and Litigation to Control Them, 52 VILL. L. REV. 21, 21 (2007) (citing various studies of aca-
demic integrity, including a 1999 survey finding 50 percent of students admitted to Internet plagiarism). 
94
  See Nation In Brief, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2006, at A15. 
95
  See S. Mitra Kalita, Schools Turn to Software to Help Stop Plagiarism, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 
2004, at T4.  
96
  See Andy Dehnart, The Web‘s Plagiarism Police, SALON.COM, June 14, 1999, 
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/1999/06/14/plagiarism (reviewing several different services); Maria 
Glod, McLean Students Sue Anti-Cheating Service; Plaintiffs Say Company‘s Database of Term Papers, 
Essays Violates Copyright Laws, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2007, at B5; Brock Read, Anti-Cheating Cru-
sader Vexes Some Professors, 54 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. Issue 25, Feb. 29, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://chronicle.com/free/v54/i25/25a00101.htm. 
97
  See Turnitin.com, Proprietary Matching Technology, http://turnitin.com/static/plagiarism.html 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2009).  
98
  See, e.g., CONFERENCE ON COLLEGE COMPOSITION AND COMMUNICATION, CCCC-IP CAUCUS 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ACADEMIC INTEGRITY AND THE USE OF PLAGIARISM DETECTION 
SERVICES (2006), available at http://ccccip.org/files/CCCC-IP-PDS-Statement-final.pdf (arguing some-
what incoherently that antiplagiarism software undermines students‘ authority over the uses of their own 
writing and fosters an artificial view of originality and the role of imitation and borrowing in writing).  
99
  Maria Glod, Score One for McLean High Students; Administration Amends Anti-Cheating Policy 
After Protests, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2006, at B1. 
100
  Glod, McLean Students Sue Anti-Cheating Service, supra note 96. 
101
  Id.; A.V. v. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
102
  Glod, McLean Students Sue Anti-Cheating Service, supra note 96.  
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Nonetheless, like iParadigms, these services are still vulnerable to claims of 
copyright infringement in relation to the web-based material they incorpo-
rate into their services.103 
Plagiarism detection services rely on access to entire copies of student 
term papers and any works from which the student might have illicitly co-
pied.104  Yet the services do not necessarily cause any of the copyrighted 
content they process to be displayed to or read by end users.105  As such, an-
tiplagiarism software also presents the paradox of nonexpressive copying: 
the service copies copyrighted works in their entirety in order to compute a 
result, but the result itself contains none of the copyrighted expression of 
the original works.  
II. THE DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF NONEXPRESSIVE USE 
A. The Principle of Nonexpressive Use 
Copyright protects only works that contain original creative expres-
sion.  As such, copyrighted works are typically capable of enjoyment, ap-
preciation, or at least comprehension by human actors.  The enjoyment of 
watching a film, listening to music, or reading a book is derived from the 
creative expression contained within those objects.  We, as viewers, listen-
ers, and readers choose some films, songs, and books over others because of 
the quality of their expression.  It is convenient to think of these experien-
tial uses as ―expressive‖ in that they relate to, and are motivated by, the ex-
pression embedded within a copyrighted work.106  This observation, that 
expressive works are usually copied in contemplation of experiential ex-
pressive uses, extends to partial copies as well.  Because meaning is derived 
from context,107 sampling a segment of music might change what that music 
 
 
 
103
  The fact that apparently the students themselves loaded their papers into the database after ac-
cepting a click-wrap agreement weakened the students‘ copyright claim.  See A.V., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 
480 (finding that the parties entered into a valid contractual agreement when plaintiffs clicked ―I Agree‖ 
to acknowledge their acceptance of the terms of the defendant‘s user agreement).  
104
  The same issue arises in relation to automated copyright detection technology used for digital 
images.  See U.S. Patent No. 7,120,274 (filed Dec. 31, 2002) (―Automated copyright detection in digital 
images.‖).  
105
  See infra notes 187–188 and accompanying text.  
106
  To the extent that this definition of the ―expressive use‖ of a copyrighted work departs from a 
conventional understanding, the reader should understand that this Article employs it as a term of art.  
107
  See RICHARD BANDLER & JOHN GRINDER, REFRAMING 2 (1982) (―In general communication 
theory there is a basic axiom that a signal only has meaning in terms of the frame or context in which it 
appears.‖); Stanley Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, 
the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, in IS THERE A TEXT IN 
THIS CLASS? 268–92 (1980) (arguing that words only have meaning because of their context). 
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expresses, but the end product is expressive in the general sense nonethe-
less.108   
The distinction between expressive and nonexpressive works is already 
well recognized in copyright law as the gatekeeper to copyright protec-
tion—novels are protected by copyright, telephone books and other uncrea-
tive compilations of data are not.109  This Article explores the importance of 
the same distinction in relation to potential acts of infringement.  In brief, 
the argument is that nonexpressive uses of copyrighted works—i.e., acts of 
copying that do not communicate the author‘s original expression to the 
public—should not generally be regarded as infringing. 
The legal status of actual copying for nonexpressive uses was not a 
burning issue before digital technology: there simply was no commercially 
relevant total literal copying directed towards a nonexpressive end.  To illu-
strate through absurdum, it would be both uncommon and nonsensical to 
photocopy Gone With The Wind and then to use it to light a fire.  This is 
technically a nonexpressive use, but not one that factors heavily in any se-
rious policy discussion.  However, digital technology and the increasing 
value of metadata have combined to make the legality of nonexpressive co-
pying arguably the most significant issue in copyright law today.  
In a world of analog works, nonexpressive uses of copyrighted works 
are fairly uncontroversial.  The metadata contained in library catalogs, topic 
indices, or even plot synopses are unquestionably valuable.  Nonetheless, 
because such uses do not typically involve copying the work in question, 
copyright owners have no legal right to object.  Similarly, prior to digital 
technology, any instance of actual copying of the copyright owner‘s work 
could be assumed to be directed at some expressive end, incendiary uses of 
Gone With The Wind notwithstanding.  Accordingly, the exclusion of facts 
and ideas from copyright subject matter was rarely important in cases of to-
tal copying—in an analog world it was almost inconceivable that someone 
could make a nonexpressive use of a copyright work that involved physical-
ly copying the entire work.  However, given the significant role of nonex-
pressive copying in Internet search engines and other copy-reliant 
technologies, the legality of nonexpressive copying is an issue that copy-
right doctrine must now address.  
 
 
 
108
  See Andrew Ross, Princes Among Thieves: Sampling in the 80s, ARTFORUM INT‘L, Mar. 2003, 
at 249 (discussing the social meaning of sampling in American hip-hop music of the 1980s); see also 
David Hesmondhalgh, Digital Sampling and Social Inequality, 15 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 53 (2006) 
(summarizing the literature and addressing the social and legal issues of music sampling as cultural 
―borrowing‖); Thomas G. Schumacher, ―This Is a Sampling Sport‖: Digital Sampling, Rap Music and 
the Law in Cultural Production, 17(2) MEDIA, CULTURE AND SOC‘Y 253, 268 (1995) (arguing that by 
facilitating the mixing of different voices in a musical text, sampling technology implicitly challenges 
―the concept of the singular artist as the only embodied voice in the text‖).  The status of computer pro-
grams under this expressive–nonexpressive paradigm is considered below.  See infra Part II.A.5. 
109
  Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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The purpose of this section is to demonstrate three related propositions: 
one descriptive, one normative, and one prescriptive.  The descriptive prop-
osition is that for the vast majority of works, the copyright owner‘s exclu-
sive rights are implicitly defined and limited in reference to expressive 
communication to the public.110  The normative proposition follows from 
the descriptive: acts of copying, which by their very nature cannot commu-
nicate the author‘s original expression to the public, should not generally be 
held to constitute copyright infringement.111  The prescriptive proposition 
addresses the implementation of the broader normative claim and argues 
that the best way to apply the general principle of nonexpressive use is via 
the fair use doctrine.  Specifically, the fair use analysis should incorporate 
the extent of the nonexpressive nature of the defendant‘s use.  For the rea-
sons detailed below, nonexpressive use is not precisely a free-standing de-
fense to copyright infringement.112  Instead, it is a consideration that 
permeates and informs the application of the fair use doctrine.113  These 
propositions are consistent with the goals of copyright generally and exist-
ing copyright doctrine. 
The express purpose of the Copyright Clause in the U.S. Constitution 
is ―to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.‖114  Copyright exists 
to encourage the creativity of authors and to promote the creation and dis-
semination of information.115  As the Supreme Court has noted on a number 
of occasions, the promotion of science and the useful arts requires a balance 
between ―the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploita-
tion of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society‘s com-
peting interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the 
other hand.‖116  Where the law strikes that balance dictates what the public 
can copy and what authors can control.  Just as importantly, it also mediates 
relationships between different generations of authors: initial authors and 
those who build upon their works.117  Thus, while copyright aims to give au-
thors an incentive to create and share their works, it also strives to provide 
subsequent authors with sufficient ―breathing space‖ to make their own ad-
 
 
 
110
  Abraham Drassinower makes a similar point in his characterization of copyright as ―an exclusive 
right of public presentation.‖  Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity 
of Copyright Vis-à-vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 204.  
111
  It is important to note that for these purposes, ―the public‖ includes individual consumers and 
thus nonexpressive use is not a synonym for personal use. 
112
  See infra Part II.B. 
113
  See infra Part II.C. 
114
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
115
  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
116
  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (quoting Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). 
117
  See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) (discussing sequential innovation in copyright and patent law). 
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ditive contributions.118  The copyright system is predicated both on the exis-
tence of certain rights to protect authors from unfair competition, and on 
significant gaps in those rights that give other authors freedom to breathe.  
Viewing copyright in terms of the communication of the expressive 
elements of the author‘s work is consistent with both economic and rights-
based understandings of copyright.  For the economist, copyright creates 
certain exclusive rights to give authors an incentive to invest in the creation 
of works that would otherwise be freely copied.  Copyright protection thus 
allows authors to internalize more of the benefits of their creations, and thus 
makes them more likely to want to create in the first place.  The natural 
rights argument for copyright is primarily an extension of the Lockean 
framework of labor as the basis of property ownership of intangibles.119  
However, this justification for property does little by itself to establish ei-
ther its form or its limitations.120  ―Personhood‖ provides an alternative non-
utilitarian view of copyright, the premise being that ―property provides a 
unique or especially suitable mechanism for self actualization, for personal 
expression, and for dignity and recognition as an individual person.‖121  In 
either case, the guiding principle of copyright is that one should generally 
not be entitled to offer the author‘s copyrighted expression to the public as a 
substitute for the work of the author.  
Copyright consists of a bundle of discrete exclusive rights, such as the 
reproduction right, the derivative right, and the public performance and dis-
play rights.122  These rights are defined, articulated, and limited by a number 
 
 
 
118
  E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005); Sony, 
464 U.S. at 479 (―The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by the copy-
right system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to 
create, and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of 
others.‖). 
119
  See 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 27 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988).  As Locke 
famously argued:  
Every Man has a Property in his own Person.  This no Body has any Right to but himself.  The 
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.  Whatsoever then 
he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour 
with, and joyned [sic] to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.   
Id.  But note that contrary to a strict Lockean approach, copyright law in the United States requires a 
minimal threshold of creativity in addition to mere ―sweat of the brow.‖  For a recent application of 
Locke to intangibles, see Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
120
  For two quite different views of Locke‘s implications for intellectual property, compare Wendy 
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intel-
lectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993), which argues that natural rights theory is necessarily con-
cerned with the rights of the public as well as with the rights of those whose labors create intellectual 
products, with Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988), which 
argues that Locke‘s labor theory can be used to justify intellectual property without many of the prob-
lems that attend its application to physical property. 
121
  Hughes, supra note 120, at 330; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) (―[T]o achieve proper self-development—to be a person—an individ-
ual needs some control over resources in the external environment.‖). 
122
  17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6) (2006).  
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of initially judge-made doctrines, such as the idea–expression distinction, 
the threshold of substantial similarity, and the fair use doctrine.123  As this 
section explores in more detail below, these doctrines typically limit copy-
right protection to the expressive aspects of original works of authorship in 
a way that confirms the place of public communication at the heart of copy-
right.  This point is important because once it is understood that copyright‘s 
primary function is to protect the author from the threat of expressive subs-
titution, the case in favor of nonexpressive uses becomes almost self-
evident.  Standing alone, a nonexpressive use carries no threat of expressive 
substitution; such uses should thus fall outside the scope of an author‘s en-
titlement.124 
Copyright‘s focus on acts that have the potential to communicate the 
author‘s original expression is immediately apparent in the exclusion of 
facts and ideas from protection by copyright.125  Nonetheless, the centrality 
of expressive substitution does not rest on the idea–expression distinction 
alone.  A number of other significant copyright doctrines also demonstrate 
that communication to the public is the touchstone of copyright infringe-
ment.  In particular, the communication of original expression to the public 
defines the metes and bounds of the publisher‘s collective right in Section 
201(c) of the Copyright Act; it defines the threshold of substantial similarity 
which is the test of copyright infringement; furthermore it explains why 
courts exclude unpublished drafts from copyright liability altogether.126  
However, it is not immediately apparent that communication to the public is 
a particularly useful lens through which to view the protection of computer 
software under copyright law.  These topics, including the exceptional sta-
tus of computer software, are now explored in detail.  
1. The Exclusion of Nonexpressive Elements from Copyright Subject 
Matter.—Copyright in an expressive work does not confer any exclusive 
rights in the facts, ideas, concepts, or discoveries contained in that work, 
regardless of the form in which the work describes, explains, or illustrates 
them.127  This principle, often simply abbreviated to the ―idea–expression 
 
 
 
123
  The Copyright Act of 1976 also reflects the idea–expression distinction and the fair use doctrine.  
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107.  But these doctrines remain essentially common law features of the copy-
right system.   
124
  Note as an analogy the case of Smith v. United States, in which Justice Scalia concludes that 
―[t]o use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose.‖  508 U.S. 223, 227 
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (holding that an individual who traded his gun for drugs had not ―used‖ a 
firearm for the purposes of the enhanced criminal sentencing provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).  See 
also Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener‘s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 25, 43 (2006).  
125
  See infra Part II.A.1.  
126
  See infra Parts II.A.2–4. 
127
  17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) 
(holding that ―no author may copyright facts or ideas‖). 
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distinction,‖ is longstanding at common law and was expressly incorporated 
into the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act.128  
At least since Baker v. Selden in 1879, courts have recognized that 
―there is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and the art which it 
is intended to illustrate.‖129  The distinction holds even in those unusual cas-
es where the true value of the work lies in the methods, systems, and ideas 
it discloses, rather than in the author‘s expression of those concepts.130  In 
Selden, for example, the plaintiff had developed a novel and useful method 
of bookkeeping, the practice of which created value regardless of how and 
from what source a bookkeeper learned the method.131  Nonetheless, the 
plaintiff‘s copyright in his instructional material was limited to the expres-
sion of his useful methods and did not encompass the methods them-
selves.132  Of course, in most cases, protecting the unique expression of an 
idea is sufficient to ensure that the author will be able to appropriate a re-
turn on her investment.  
Copyright law also clearly distinguishes between facts and the expres-
sion of facts, providing no protection for the former and only limited pro-
tection for the latter.133  In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that copying listings from a tele-
phone directory did not infringe the copyright in that directory because the 
information itself was not copyrightable.134  As the Court explained, facts—
whether they are telephone numbers and addresses or the details of histori-
cal occurrences—are not ―original‖ to the author.135  The author‘s copyright, 
 
 
 
128
  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) provides: ―In no case does copyright protection for an original work of au-
thorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or dis-
covery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a 
work.‖ 
129
  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).  ―Art‖ and ―illustrate‖ are not meant in the aesthetic 
sense in this context. 
130
  Id.  Note also that the copyright protection available for maps is somewhat thin as a result.  See 
1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[A] and the cases cited therein.  
131
  Id. at 99–100.  Selden‘s system may well have been patentable under today‘s standards.  See 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that a patent on a data processing system is valid).  But see Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabo-
lite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has never endorsed the Federal Circuit‘s ―useful, concrete, and tangible result‖ test for patentable 
processes).  See generally Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes 
from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1924 (2007) (arguing that thin copyright protec-
tion for computer programs is especially appropriate given the availability of patent protection for pro-
gram innovations). 
132
  Baker, 101 U.S. at 103-04. 
133
  See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (holding that facts 
are not copyrightable and that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin). 
134
  Id. at 362-63. 
135
  Id. at 348 (―[C]opyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are orig-
inal to the author.‖). 
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therefore, did not cover the facts themselves.136  The Feist Court further held 
that the expression of those facts was not protectable, because the selection 
and alphabetical arrangement of those facts in the telephone directory was 
―so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.‖137 
Through the idea–expression distinction, copyright law protects the 
expressive elements of the author‘s work while guaranteeing subsequent au-
thors the necessary breathing space to make their own contributions by add-
ing to, reusing, or reinterpreting the facts and ideas embodied in the original 
work.  Subsequent authors may not compete with the copyright owner by 
offering her original expression to the public as a substitute for the copy-
right owner‘s work, but they are free to compete with their own expression 
of the same facts, concepts, and ideas.  Accordingly, the idea–expression 
distinction is a central element of the balance between the interests of au-
thors in preventing the exploitation of their writings and society‘s compet-
ing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce.138  
The exclusion of facts and ideas from the ambit of copyright protection 
applies with equal force to nonexpressive copying in the digital age.  In 
spite of the fact that metadata is increasingly valuable in the information 
age, it is no more copyrightable than it was 100 years ago.  The undisputed 
value of individual facts, such as the title of a book or its location in a li-
brary, does not change the copyright status of those facts.  As a general rule, 
metadata is not subject to copyright protection: one can extract and repro-
duce facts, names, and dates from a newspaper article, or ideas and 
processes from an instructional text, without infringing the author‘s copy-
right.139  Whether Congress should, or even could, alter the traditional con-
tours of copyright by extending its protection to facts and ideas merits 
debate, but there is no doubt that copyright law currently offers no such 
protection.140  
The idea–expression distinction limits the rights of the copyright owner 
to the expressive elements of the author‘s work: in the analog context, this 
is achieved by simply holding that the copying of facts and ideas alone does 
 
 
 
136
  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (―No author may 
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.‖). 
137
  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (holding that the selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural‘s 
white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection); see also 
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., v. West Publ‘g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that West‘s fac-
tual enhancements to judicial opinions could be reasonably viewed as obvious, typical, and lacking even 
minimal creativity). 
138
  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also Warner 
Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (describing the idea–expression 
distinction as ―an effort to enable courts to adjust the tension between these competing effects of copy-
right protection‖). 
139
  See Feist, 499 U.S. 340; Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).  
140
  See generally Jonathan Band & Makoto Kono, The Database Protection Debate in the 106th 
Congress, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 869 (2001) (discussing legislative proposals to provide database protection). 
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not constitute infringement.  Preserving the functional force of the idea–
expression distinction in the digital context requires a slightly different ap-
plication: copying for purely nonexpressive purposes, such as the auto-
mated extraction of data, should not be regarded as infringing.  
2. The Collective Work Right.—The collective work right also demo- 
nstrates that communication to the public is the touchstone of copyright in-
fringement.  The Copyright Act gives authors the exclusive right to repro-
duce their works in copies.  The Act, however, also confers a special 
privilege on the owners of collective works, such as magazines and news-
papers, which allows them to reproduce and distribute individual contribu-
tions as part of the collective work and revisions thereof.141  The collective 
work right creates an apparent conflict with the general reproduction right 
by allowing magazines and newspapers to reproduce the works of individu-
al authors without their consent in certain circumstances.  That conflict 
came to a head in New York Times v. Tasini.142  In that case, six freelance 
authors sued a group of publishers, including the Times Company, for plac-
ing articles written by the authors into third party electronic databases with-
out the authors‘ consent.  The publishers relied on their ―‗privilege‘‖, 
contained in Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act, to reproduce and distri-
bute the freelance authors‘ contributions as part of a revision to a collective 
work.143 
The Supreme Court‘s resolution of the conflict between the general re-
production right and the collective work right confirms the centrality of 
public perception and expressive communication to the public in determin-
ing the rights of the copyright owner.  In Tasini, the Supreme Court rejected 
the Times Company‘s broad construction of its collective right, holding that 
because the articles in question were ―presented to, and retrievable by, the 
user in isolation, clear of the context the original print publication pre-
sented,‖ they did not qualify as part of a revision to the original collective 
work.144  
The defendants in Tasini had argued that their conversion of printed 
back issues to an electronic form amounted to revision of the collective 
work, and was thus sheltered under Section 201(c) of the Act.145  From the 
Times Company‘s perspective, electronic storage was no different from the 
conversion of newsprint to microfilm.146  As with the electronic database, 
microfilm required archiving the entire issue to facilitate later retrieval of 
specific articles.  The Court, however, held that what mattered was not how 
the articles were stored, but how they were retrieved and displayed to us-
 
 
 
141
  17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2006). 
142
  N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
143
  Id. at 491-92.  
144
  Id. at 487. 
145
  Id. at 499. 
146
  Id. at 501. 
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ers.147  Unlike microfilm files, the database presented the individual articles 
to the user devoid of their initial context.148  The Court‘s view was that only 
user perception mattered and that whether the articles were stored in their 
initial sequence was irrelevant to both readers and authors alike.149  The 
Court thus held that ―[i]n determining whether the Articles have been re-
produced and distributed as part of a revision of the collective works in is-
sue, we focus on the Articles as presented to, and perceptible by, the user of 
the Databases.‖150  
Although Tasini is not an instance of nonexpressive use, it nonetheless 
supports the proposition that acts of copying that do not communicate the 
author‘s original expression to the public do not constitute copyright in-
fringement.  By defining the scope of the publishers‘ collective works privi-
lege in terms of what is communicated to the public and dismissing the 
relevance of unseen uses within the defendants‘ databases, the Court rein-
forced that expressive communication to the public is the touchstone of 
copyright infringement.  
3. Substantial Similarity.—The centrality of expressive communicat- 
ion to the public is inherent in the tests applied by the courts to determine 
the threshold of infringement—the tests that determine when some copying 
becomes too much copying.  As discussed in more detail below, the appli-
cation of the test of substantial similarity further demonstrates that copying 
which does not interfere with the exclusivity of the copyright owner‘s 
communication of her work to the public does not infringe the exclusive 
rights of the author.151 
The copyright owner‘s exclusive right to ―reproduce the copyrighted 
work in copies‖ extends to both exact and inexact reproductions.152  In both 
cases, however, the Copyright Act leaves the threshold of reproduction—
the question of how much of the copyrighted work must be copied—
undefined.  In cases of ―nonliteral infringement,‖—where the accused work 
is not an exact copy of the copyright owner‘s work—courts assess whether 
 
 
 
147
  Id. at 503–04 (―The crucial fact is that the Databases, like the hypothetical library, store and re-
trieve articles separately within a vast domain of diverse texts.  Such a storage and retrieval system ef-
fectively overrides the Authors‘ exclusive right to control the individual reproduction and distribution of 
each Article.‖) (citations omitted). 
148
  Id. at 501. 
149
  Id. at 501 n.9. 
150
  Id. at 499 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
151
  ‖Substantial similarity‖ in this sense should not be confused with what is more properly termed 
―probative similarity,‖ which is the circumstantial evidence of copying founded upon the unlikely simi-
larity between the accused work and the purported original.  See Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., Inc., 
720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
152
  17 U.S.C. § 106(1); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (―[T]he 
question is whether the part so taken is substantial.‖) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
103:1607  (2009) Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology 
 1633 
the allegedly infringing work possesses a ―substantial similarity‖ to the co-
pyrighted work.153   
Courts define the threshold of substantial similarity in reference to the 
perspective of the ordinary observer.154  Infringement is defined in reference 
to the perspective of the consuming public, because the copyright owner‘s 
―legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputation . . . but his interest 
in the potential financial returns from his [work] which derive from the lay 
public‘s approbation of his efforts.‖155  As such, the tests of substantial simi-
larity provide further evidence that copyright primarily protects the author 
against expressive substitution.  
Courts also apply the threshold of substantial similarity in cases of 
fragmented actual copying, such as in music sampling or collage.156  For ex-
ample, in Newton v. Diamond, the plaintiff alleged that the Beastie Boys 
had infringed his copyright in a musical composition by including a six 
second sample of a sound recording in their own musical creation, ―Pass the 
Mic.‖157  The Beastie Boys had obtained a license with respect to the sound 
recording, but had not thought it necessary to seek a license from the com-
poser given their limited use and the sparse nature of Newton‘s original 
composition.158  
Where the defendant copies a portion of the plaintiff‘s work exactly or 
nearly exactly, without appropriating the work‘s overall essence or struc-
ture, the courts apply a test of ―fragmented literal similarity‖ to determine if 
the substantial similarity threshold has been met.159  In cases of fragmented 
literal similarity, courts determine whether the copying amounts to in-
fringement ―by considering the qualitative and quantitative significance of 
 
 
 
153
  See Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 131 (2d 
Cir. 2003); Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992).  
154
  See Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (summarizing authorities). 
155
  Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (footnotes omitted); see also Warner Bros., 
Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983). 
156
  See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that ―the substantiality 
requirement applies throughout the law of copyright‖).  As David Nimmer notes, the Sixth Circuit‘s 
Bridgeport decision suggests otherwise; however, that decision is almost certainly in error on this point.  
See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2][b]; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 
792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
157
  Newton, 388 F.3d at 1191. 
158
  The sample corresponds to three notes on the original composition, C-D flat-C, over a held C 
note.  The score to ―Choir‖ also indicates that the entire song should be played in a largo/senza-misura 
tempo, meaning ―slowly or without-measure.‖  Id.  Note that sound recordings and their underlying 
compositions are separate and distinct copyrighted works.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7). 
159
  As the Second Circuit explained in Twin Peaks, ―the concept of similarity embraces not only 
global similarities in structure and sequence, but localized similarity in language.  In both cases, the trier 
of fact must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to qualify as substantial.‖  Twin Peaks 
Prods. v. Publ‘ns Int‘l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 
1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (―[T]he work may copy only a small part of the copyrighted work but do so 
word-for-word.  If this fragmented copy is important to the copyrighted work, and of sufficient quantity, 
then it may support a finding of substantial similarity.‖). 
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the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff‘s work as a whole.‖160  Apply-
ing this test to the Beastie Boys appropriation of a fragment of Newton‘s 
original musical composition, ―C– - D flat– - C, over a held C note,‖ the 
court found that ―no reasonable juror could find the sampled portion of the 
composition to be a quantitatively or qualitatively significant portion of the 
composition as a whole.‖161 
This focus on the qualitative and quantitative significance of the copied 
portion in the plaintiff‘s work is consistent with the prohibition against ex-
pressive substitution.  Even where some of the copyright owner‘s original 
expression has been copied directly, such copying does not rise to the level 
of infringement unless the expression was significant, in either quantity or 
quality, in the author‘s original work.  Just as copyright law does not pre-
vent the copying of facts and ideas, it also permits copying of trivial expres-
sive elements from an existing work, because to do so does not unfairly 
compete with the copyright owner.162  In other words, trivial copying of ex-
pressive elements is not copyright infringement because it does not interfere 
with the copyright owner‘s exclusive right to communicate her work to the 
public.  
The law relating to fragmented literal similarity not only shows that 
communication of protected expression to the public defines and limits the 
copyright owner‘s exclusive rights.  It also demonstrates that acts of copy-
ing that do not communicate the author‘s original expression to the public 
do not generally constitute copyright infringement.  
4. Allegations of Intermediate Copying in Hollywood.—Meritless cl- 
aims of copyright infringement are a recognized cost of doing business in 
Hollywood.163  Some of these claims are merely opportunistic, while others 
are motivated by the plaintiff‘s genuine belief that all his or her own ideas 
are unique and that there are no coincidences.  Madrid v. Chronicle Books 
is representative of the latter phenomenon.164  In that case, the author of a 
one-page poem about a land of monsters who are afraid of human children 
 
 
 
160
  Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195 (citing Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 570 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 1987)); see also Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 289–90 (D.N.J. 1993); 4 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2][a], at 13-57–58.  
161
  Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195. 
162
  Id. at 1193 (―The principle that trivial copying does not constitute actionable infringement has 
long been a part of copyright law.‖); id. at 1195 (―[T]he dispositive question is whether the copying goes 
to trivial or substantial elements.‖). 
163
  Matthew Belloni, THR Esquire, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, June 26, 2007 (―Like expensive CGI 
and flashy premieres, defending copyright lawsuits by writers who think their screenplays have been 
ripped off is just another cost of doing business for studios.‖); Verne Gay, Flash!: The Latest Entertain-
ment News and More . . ., NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1998, at A12 (in thanking the studios for defending 
against a claim that his screenplay for the movie Twister had stolen from another screenplay, Michael 
Crichton said: ―I hope it will usher in a new era where studios fight these frivolous charges and don‘t 
treat it as a cost of doing business‖). 
164
  Madrid v. Chronicle Books, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Wyo. 2002). 
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alleged that the Pixar film Monsters, Inc. infringed her copyright.165  The 
court held, however, that the inverted plot of monsters afraid of children 
was generic.166  Other cases involve works with similar themes,167 similar 
descriptive titles applied to the same general subject,168 or similarities dis-
cernable only to the plaintiffs themselves.169   
Confronted with motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs often urge 
the courts to allow them to scrutinize every single draft of the defendant‘s 
screenplay, in the hope that some earlier version of the work will disclose a 
greater resemblance to their own copyrighted work than the finished film 
does.170  Courts invariably deny these requests.171  The reasons behind the 
denials provide an important insight into the structure of copyright law.  
Courts refuse to entertain discovery with respect to early drafts of a 
noninfringing final work precisely because infringement requires at least 
 
 
 
165
  Id. at 1234. 
166
  Id.  Two antecedents spring immediately to mind.  First, E.T. hiding in the cupboard from Elliot.  
E.T.: THE EXTRA-TERRESTRIAL (Universal Pictures 1982).  Second, Max‘s dominion over the fearful 
monsters in Where The Wild Things Are.  MAURICE SENDAK, WHERE THE WILD THINGS ARE (1963). 
167
  For example, in Litchfield v. Spielberg the author of a musical play about two aliens stranded at 
the North Pole unsuccessfully accused the producers of the motion picture E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial of 
infringement.  See 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding no substantial similarity between the 
sequences of events, mood, dialogue, and characters of the two works); see also Warner Bros., Inc. v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 235, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that the protagonist in the televi-
sion series The Greatest American Hero was not sufficiently similar to the D.C. Comic‘s Superman cha-
racter to warrant consideration of the plaintiff‘s copyright infringement claim by a jury; as the court 
observed, ―[i]n the genre of superheroes, Hinkley follows Superman as, in the genre of detectives, In-
spector Clouseau follows Sherlock Holmes‖). 
168
  In Davis v. United Artists, Inc., the author of the 1972 Vietnam novel entitled ―Coming Home‖ 
failed to demonstrate copyright infringement in relation to a 1978 Vietnam film also titled ―Coming 
Home.‖  547 F. Supp. 722, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding no similarity between the two works).  In 
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., the author of the autobiographical policeman‘s tale Fort Apache unsuc-
cessfully alleged that the Time Life film Fort Apache, The Bronx amounted to copyright infringement.  
615 F. Supp. 430, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that no reasonable observer could find substantial simi-
larity and that ―[a]ny similarity that may exist is either trivial, abstract or non-protectible as a matter of 
law‖). 
169
  For example, in Stromback v. New Line Cinema, the author of a screenplay outline about a call-
ous reporter who brings down a corrupt governor accused the writers of the film Little Nicky of copy-
right infringement; Little Nicky is a comedy about the Devil and his three sons, one of whom, played by 
Adam Sandler, has a speech impediment.  See 384 F.3d 283, 297 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding no similarity 
between the works other than at the most superficial level).  Equally incomprehensible is the claim in 
Flaherty v. Filardi, in which the producers of Bringing Down the House, an odd-couple film about a 
lonely tax attorney who meets a woman on the Internet who, unknown to him, happens to be in prison, 
were alleged to have infringed the copyright of the screenplay Amoral Dilemma, the rather grim story of 
a disaffected young Manhattan insurance attorney who knowingly corresponds with a death row prison-
er.  See 388 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
170
  See, e.g., Stromback, 384 F.3d 283; Flaherty, v. Filardi, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69202, at *8–9 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2007) (copyright claim to interim drafts of a published non-infringing final work 
dismissed as a matter of law); Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 434 (request to discover drafts denied).  
171
  See Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 435 (noting that courts routinely reject requests to consider earlier 
drafts of screenplays). 
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some potential interference with the copyright owner‘s expectation of ex-
clusivity.  As noted in Davis v. United Artists, ―the ultimate test of in-
fringement must be the film as produced and broadcast, we do not consider 
the preliminary scripts.‖172  Courts do not refuse to examine interim drafts 
merely because of judicial economy; as the Second Circuit noted in Warner 
Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., ―a defendant may legitimately 
avoid infringement by intentionally making sufficient changes in a work 
which would otherwise be regarded as substantially similar to that of the 
plaintiff‘s.‖173 
The refusal of courts to entertain copyright infringement allegations in 
relation to unpublished drafts and preliminary scripts demonstrates the prac-
tical importance of a focus on expressive substitution.  Because the copy-
right owner‘s rights are generally limited to the communication of their 
original expression to the public, even if it were not in the public domain, a 
filmmaker would be perfectly entitled to start with Jane Austen‘s Emma and 
rework the plot over and over again until she comes out with Clueless.174  
Intermediate scripts that never see the light of day do not communicate the 
author‘s original expression to the public and thus cannot constitute copy-
right infringement.  
5. Computer Software: An Exception?—Copyright protection for co- 
mputer software has long been a source of controversy and disquiet.175  Al-
though the broad language of the statutory definition of ―literary works‖ in 
the Copyright Act includes computer programs,176 treating software as a 
work of literature presents something of a contradiction.  The 1976 Copy-
 
 
 
172
  Davis, 547 F. Supp. at 724 n.9 (citing Fuld v. Nat‘l Broad. Co., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 877, 882 n.4 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975)); see also Stromback, 384 F.3d at 299 (―In deciding infringement claims, courts have 
held that only the version of the alleged infringing work presented to the public should be considered.‖); 
Madrid v. Chronicle Books, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1234 (D. Wyo. 2002) (―Since a court considers the 
works as they were presented to the public, discovery in this case . . . would be pointless.‖) (internal qu-
otation marks omitted); Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 434 (―The Court considers the works as they were pre-
sented to the public.‖).  
173
  Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 3 NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B] at 13-38.1 to -38.2; Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 
501 (2d Cir. 1982); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 904, 913 & n.11 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
174
  CLUELESS (Paramount 1995). 
175
  For a range of opinions, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Su-
periority of Copyright over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2559 
(1994); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989); and Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protec-
tion of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV 2308 (1994). 
176
  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (―literary works‖ includes works ―expressed in words, numbers, or other 
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia‖); see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 16 (1978) (concluding that ―it was clearly the intent of 
Congress to include computer programs within the scope of copyrightable subject matter in the Act of 
1976‖); but see Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663. 
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right Act clearly states that copyright protection does not extend to any 
―process, system, [or] method of operation . . . .‖177  And yet, thanks to an 
amendment made in 1980, the Act clearly extends copyright protection to 
computer programs, which are defined as ―a set of statements or instruc-
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a 
certain result.‖178  A ―set of instructions‖ used ―in order to bring about a cer-
tain result‖ appears to be the very essence of the ―process, system, method 
of operation‖ exclusion under Section 102(b).  
With this contradiction in mind, it is hardly surprising that the general 
theory of copyright advanced in this Article—the centrality of expressive 
substitution—does not fit perfectly to software.179  Users do not typically 
copy copyrighted computer programs so that they can imbibe the artistry of 
the programmer‘s expression.  In most cases no human being ever directly 
observes that expression.  Instead, the copyrighted software sends a series 
of commands to a computer (usually via a software platform and an operat-
ing system) which brings about a certain result such as launching a word 
processing program or a video game.  Aspects of the word processor or the 
video game may themselves be expressive, but it is something of a stretch 
to argue that the underlying computer program is itself used expressively.  
To be clear, in terms of copyrighted subject matter, a computer program 
should be considered to be expressive.  However, the ordinary use of a 
computer program is more functional than expressive.  The distinction be-
tween expressive and nonexpressive uses is not intended to eviscerate copy-
right protection for computer software.180  As the preceding discussion 
makes clear, the rational justification for copyright is generally that it pro-
tects the author against expressive substitution—the anomalous nature of 
computer software points to a different basis for attaching copyright protec-
tion and thus does not admit a defense of nonexpressive use to the same ex-
tent.  In sum, computer software should continue to be treated as 
exceptional—nonexpressive use should not be regarded as a defense to or-
dinary acts of software piracy.181  
 
 
 
177
  17 U.S.C. § 102(b).  Exclusive rights in processes and methods of opperation are generally left 
to the patent system.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
178
  Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, sec. 10, 94 
Stat. 3028; 17 U.S.C. § 101, as amended by Pub. L. 96-517, Sec. 10(a).   
179
  The same objections could be raised with respect to the copyright protection of architectural 
plans, and the following discussion applies mutatis mutandis to that subject matter.  The Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act (1988) and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (1990) recognize 
two separate forms of protection for architectural works, one for architectural plans and the other for 
structures based on such plans.  For an overview, see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08. 
180
  As will be explained in more detail below, a use that effectively undermines the rationale of 
copyright protection for a particular class of work can hardly be regarded as fair.  See infra Part II.C. 
181
  However, as noted below, the nonexpressive use analysis still provides a useful framework for 
understanding software reverse engineering cases.  See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
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The difference between copyright in software and in ―normal‖ literary 
works is apparent from the case law relating to intermediate copying.  As 
discussed in the previous subsection, in the context of the motion picture 
industry, courts have refused to entertain the notion that intermediate scripts 
that never see the light of day could result in copyright infringement.  In 
contrast, in software reverse engineering cases, courts take the allegation of 
infringement via intermediate copying seriously as a potential basis for in-
fringement.182  Nonetheless, in the case of computer software, the interme-
diate copying required for reverse engineering has invariably been found to 
constitute fair use.  
We should not be particularly troubled that statutory accretions to the 
copyright system such as computer software and architectural plans do not 
conform to the general theory outlined in this Article.  While the introduc-
tion of these non-native species has certainly altered copyright‘s landscape, 
their mere existence should not prevent us from articulating a coherent 
theory with respect to subject matter indigenous to copyright.  The general 
theory that expressive substitution is fundamental to copyright infringement 
necessarily makes an exception for works that consist of the ―process,‖ 
―system,‖ or ―method of operation‖ designed to bring about a certain result.  
This is the difference between a general theory and a universal one.  
 
 * * * 
 
This section has explored the centrality of expressive substitution to a 
variety of doctrines and applications: the idea–expression distinction, sub-
stantial similarity, the collective work right, and finally, the refusal of 
courts to entertain infringement actions solely based on unpublished inter-
mediate drafts of literary works.  With the exception of anomalous subject 
matter such as software, copyright law appears to embrace a general con-
cept of expressive substitution.  To the extent that communication of origi-
nal expression to the public is the touchstone of copyright infringement, it 
follows that copyright liability should not ordinarily be found in circums-
tances where the use in question is incapable of giving rise to any expres-
sive communication.  Once the pivotal nature of expressive substitution to 
copyright infringement is properly understood, the implications for copy-
reliant technologies crystallize: the nonexpressive use of a copyrighted 
work should not ordinarily result in copyright infringement.  To be clear, 
nonexpressive uses are merely a subset of uses that do not create any risk of 
expressive substitution; the advance of digital technology has made that 
subset increasingly important, however.  
 
 
 
182
  See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm‘t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518–19 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that files and prin-
touts created during the reverse engineering process meet the requirements for being a ―copy‖ and 
―therefore fall[] squarely within the category of acts that are prohibited‖).  
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B. Doctrinal Incorporation of Nonexpressive Use  
As discussed above, the general principle of nonexpressive use—that 
acts of copying which do not communicate the author‘s original expression 
to the public should not be held to constitute copyright infringement—flows 
naturally from an analysis of existing copyright doctrines.  Just as authors 
possess no copyright in the facts and ideas contained within their works, the 
rights of authors to control the copying of their works should not generally 
include copying that offers no possibility of expressive substitution because 
it is entirely nonexpressive in nature.  As the doctrinal survey in section A 
demonstrates, authors possess a set of limited and largely economic rights 
to control the expressive uses of their works.  Except in already anomalous 
cases such as computer software, extending those rights to encompass non-
expressive uses would constitute a significant departure from existing copy-
right principles.  The preceding discussion has established the general 
principle of nonexpressive use; we now turn to the prescriptive implications 
of that principle.  Specifically, this section demonstrates why the principle 
of nonexpressive use should be applied in the context of copyright‘s fair use 
doctrine and not as a freestanding defense to copyright infringement.  The 
next section then explains how nonexpressive use fits within a traditional 
fair use analysis.  
How does the principle of nonexpressive use relate to copy-reliant 
technology?  As set forth in more detail below, the copying at issue in the 
case studies discussed in Part I was manifestly different from the usual cop-
yright infringement scenario.  Entire works were copied, but the purpose of 
that copying was not to convey the work‘s expressive qualities to the pub-
lic, but rather to enable banks of microprocessors to index the content of 
those works and to generate metadata about the works.  Explicit recognition 
of this principle of nonexpressive use would significantly clarify the legal 
status of copy-reliant technologies such as Internet search engines, plagiar-
ism detection software, and the Google Book project.  However, acknowl-
edging the principle of nonexpressive use raises the subsidiary question of 
how to implement the principle in the law.  
Although a court could rule that the use of a copyrighted work that 
does not communicate its expressive content is per se not a violation of the 
copyright owner‘s rights under Section 106 of the Copyright Act, this Ar-
ticle does not recommend that course for three reasons.  First, the statutory 
text of Section 106 does not directly support the concept of nonexpressive 
use.  For example, Section 106(1) gives copyright owners the exclusive 
rights ―to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.‖183  The Act defines 
―[c]opies‖ as ―material objects . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from 
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
 
 
 
183
  17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
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cated.‖184  Thus, the requirement for a copy is only that the work is capable 
of being perceived, not that anyone actually perceives it and uses it expres-
sively.  The second reason not to interpret Section 106 as providing a blan-
ket exclusion for nonexpressive use is that, as noted above, the principle 
may not apply to some of copyright‘s more irregular subject matter, such as 
computer software and architectural plans.  The exceptional status of com-
puter software in particular suggests that the principle requires a more con-
text-specific implementation.  The third reason not to adopt a per se rule 
with respect to nonexpressive use is that in many contexts the concept is 
ambiguous.  Where the validity of a defendant‘s claim that a particular use 
is nonexpressive is contestable, courts may find that adopting a categorical 
rule that nonexpressive uses are noninfringing simply shifts the focus of ar-
gument from substantive questions to questions of category definition.  
Although the principle of nonexpressive use articulated in this Article 
is important, it is not free from ambiguity.  The extraction of factual infor-
mation—such as names, dates, and places—is a nonexpressive use, in that it 
does not relate to the expression of these facts, but to the facts them-
selves.185  Similarly, generating factual information about a work should al-
so be categorized as a nonexpressive use of the underlying work.  For 
example, publishing the fact that the novel Moby Dick was written by Her-
man Melville in 1851 and contains the word ―whale‖ 783 times would not 
infringe any copyright in the book because this information about the work 
is independent of the expressive value of the work.186  
Similarly, the nonexpressive use of some copy-reliant technologies is 
fairly clear-cut.  Plagiarism detection software illustrates one of the less 
ambiguous applications of the nonexpressive use principle.  These services 
rely on access to entire copies of student term papers and any works from 
which a student might have copied them; yet the services do not necessarily 
display any of the copyrighted content they process to the end users.  Pla-
giarism detection software works by comparing strings of text in new works 
to strings of text in existing works.187  If the software finds a match, it indi-
 
 
 
184
  17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
185
  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (―In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.‖). 
186
  Moby Dick is in the public domain in the United States and is available at Project Guttenberg at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/2701.  
187
  The similarities between two works can be assessed by simply looking for common strings of 
words.  See Amy Argetsinger, Technology Snares Cheaters at U-Va.; Physics Professor‘s Computer 
Search Triggers Investigation of 122 Students, WASH. POST, May 9, 2001, at A1.  However, there are 
also various algorithms that can be applied to a document to create a digital fingerprint, which captures 
other characteristics of the work.  These digital fingerprints allow a document to be characterized by its 
structure, vocabulary, and content; they are essentially abstractions of the original documents and allow 
for faster comparisons, which will not be as easily deceived by minor text alterations.  See, e.g., Khair 
Eddin M. Sabri & Jubair J. Al-Ja‘afer, The JK System to Detect Plagiarism, 6(2) J. COMPUTER SCI. & 
TECH. 66 (2006).  The Turnitin software uses statistical techniques originally designed to analyze brain 
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cates as much.  By itself, the report that a new work is similar to another 
work already in the database in no way reproduces or communicates the ex-
pressive qualities of either work.188  Of course, most plagiarism software is 
also programmed to display the source file from which the work being scru-
tinized was allegedly copied.  This optional feature may indeed be regarded 
as expressive, although not necessarily without fair use protection.  None-
theless, many other significant copy-reliant technologies present some de-
gree of ambiguity as to whether they should be regarded as expressive or 
nonexpressive.  
In both Field and Perfect 10, the courts effectively found that the pri-
mary purpose of the copying at issue was nonexpressive.  In Field, the court 
held that although allowing users to retrieve web pages from the search en-
gine cache also allowed them to be read, the primary use of the cache was 
nonexpressive and thus noninfringing.189  The court found that to the extent 
that Google itself copied or distributed Field‘s copyrighted works by allow-
ing access to them through cached links, Google had engaged in a fair use 
of those copyrighted works.190  The court relied heavily on the differences 
between Google‘s use of the works and any expressive or artistic value that 
Field‘s work might have otherwise had.191  Although the court did not em-
ploy the terminology set forth in this Article, its reasoning illustrates that 
the relevant distinction was that Google‘s use was nonexpressive.  The 
court gave a number of reasons why Google‘s use of the works in the form 
of cached links did not serve the same function as the original works.  Pri-
marily, the court noted that cached links enable Internet users to detect 
changes that have been made to a particular web page over time—changes 
which may have important ramifications.192  As the court noted: ―by defini-
tion, this information location function cannot be served by the original 
Web page alone.  To conduct such a comparison, a user would need to 
access both Google‘s archival copy of a Web page and the current form of 
the Web page on the Internet.‖193  In addition, the court also noted that the 
availability of cached links enables users to understand why the search en-
gine indicated that a seemingly irrelevant web page was responsive to their 
query.194  
                                                                                                                           
waves to compare the fingerprints of student papers to more than a billion documents that have been 
fingerprinted in a similar fashion.  See Plagiarise.  Let No One Else‘s Work Evade Your Eyes, THE 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2002 (U.S. Edition). 
188
  In practice, plagiarism detection providers also issue reports identifying the text allegedly copied 
and the source document; however, the basic matching function can be performed with no communica-
tion of expression at all. 
189
  Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115 (D. Nev. 2006). 
190
  Id. at 1118. 
191
  Id. at 1118–19. 
192
  Id.  
193
  Id. at 1119. 
194
  Id. 
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Although these functions relate to the copyrighted expression con-
tained in the original website, they do not replicate the expressive function 
of the original.  Axiomatically, the use of a cached version of a web page to 
detect changes is a use not served by the original copyrighted work alone.  
Likewise, referring to the cache to understand better the relationship be-
tween a particular page and a particular search term is also a use not served 
by the original copyrighted work alone.195  
Perfect 10 presents a similar ambiguity and a similar resolution.196  In 
Perfect 10, the thumbnail representations were clearly visible to the public.  
The court of appeals, however, found that the thumbnails did not fulfill a 
demand for the originals as expressive works.197  The court held that the 
plaintiff had raised a prima facie case of infringement because Google‘s 
thumbnail representations were literally copied from Perfect 10‘s works and 
were displayed by the search engine.198  However, the court found that 
Google‘s creation of thumbnail representations did not infringe Perfect 10‘s 
rights, in large measure because the purpose of the copying the plaintiff 
complained of was a different use, a nonexpressive use.199  The court of ap-
peals distinguished the use of thumbnails by Google as pointing devices 
from the use of pictures as expressive works themselves.  In the court‘s 
words, Google‘s replication of the original works as thumbnails ―served a 
different function‖ unrelated to ―artistic expression.‖200  The court further 
explained: ―[a]lthough an image may have been created originally to serve 
an entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine trans-
forms the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of informa-
tion.‖201  In other words, although the thumbnail representations were 
technically a copy of Perfect 10‘s original works, they were not used to ful-
fill the public‘s demand for small grainy photos of unclad women, but ra-
ther as pointing devices to instruct users where they might find the photos 
they are looking for.  
In both Field and Perfect 10, there was at least the possibility that the 
search engine copying could function as an expressive substitute for the 
copyright owners‘ original works.  Nonetheless, in both cases the courts 
found that the copying at issue did not fulfill a demand for the originals as 
 
 
 
195
  Not all assertions of nonexpressive use deserve equal credence.  Reproducing an entire film, 
with additional commentary, to explain its nomination for an Academy Award would not likely qualify 
as a nonexpressive use.  In this example, the fact that the amount of the underlying work copied grossly 
exceeds what was necessary gives the lie to the claim that the use was nonexpressive.  See infra Part 
II.C.3. 
196
  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).  
197
  Id. at 721.  
198
  Id. at 719. 
199
  Id. at 725 (reversing the district court‘s ruling that the use of thumbnails was not fair use). 
200
  Id. at 721 (citation and quotation omitted); see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 
819 (9th Cir. 2003). 
201
  Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 721. 
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expressive works.202  In Field, the court found that the mere technical possi-
bility that someone might recall an object from the cache to enjoy its ex-
pressive qualities was insufficient to characterize caching in general as an 
expressive use of copyrighted works, given that the predominant uses of the 
cached content were unrelated to the expressive function of the original 
works.203  In Perfect 10, the court acknowledged the possibility that some 
users might see the thumbnail representations as substitutes for the origi-
nals; however, despite this possibility, the court dismissed the plaintiff‘s 
claim of expressive substitution as speculative and unlikely.204  In the 
court‘s opinion, because the search engine used thumbnail representations 
to show users which websites contained images relevant to their search 
terms, they were not substitutes for the originals.205  The potential for ex-
pressive and nonexpressive uses to sit side by side in cases such as Field 
and Perfect 10 highlights the limits of a strictly categorical approach.  This 
in turn suggests the need to integrate the issue of nonexpressive use into a 
fair use analysis, as explained in section C below. 
The Google Book search engine litigation also illustrates the potential 
ambiguity of nonexpressive use.  Google is in the process of scanning the 
text of millions of books in order to create the metadata that drives the 
Google Book search engine.  The object of all this indiscriminant copying is 
the production of metadata—thus, to understand the Google Book contro-
versy, it is first necessary to appreciate the value of metadata in the infor-
mation age.  Information is only useful to the extent that it is relevant, 
discernable, and available.  There are thousands of volumes of information 
in even the smallest libraries; however, these dusty tomes are mere orna-
ments unless a user has some means to locate a particular book, or better yet 
a particular page, that may be of interest.  This is the point where metadata 
becomes valuable.  Metadata refers simply to information about informa-
tion, or data about data.206  The traditional (and now obsolete) library ―card 
catalog‖ is an archetypal metadata repository—the card catalog contains in-
formation about the author, title, and subject matter, but it does not contain 
the volumes themselves.207  As the quantity of available information in-
 
 
 
202
  Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006); Perfect 10, 487 F.3d 701. 
203
  Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1118–19. 
204
  Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 721. 
205
  Id. at 724. 
206
  Metadata is defined as ―structured, encoded data that describe characteristics of information-
bearing entities to aid in the identification, discovery, assessment, and management of the described ent-
ities.‖  AM. LIBRARY ASS‘N ALCTS CC:DA TASK FORCE ON METADATA, SUMMARY REPORT (June 
1999), http://www.libraries.psu.edu/tas/jca/ccda/tf-meta3.html; see also Ganesan Shankaranarayanan & 
Adir Evan, The Metadata Enigma, 49 COMMS. ACM 88 (2006) (arguing that most definitions of meta-
data ignore its richness and complexity). 
207
  See BARBARA TILLET, WHAT IS FRBR?: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR THE BIBLIOGRAPHIC 
UNIVERSE (Library of Congress Cataloging Distribution Service 2004), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/cds/downloads/FRBR.pdf; IFLA STUDY GROUP ON THE FUNCTIONAL 
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creases, so too does the value of metadata used to organize, search, rank, 
and retrieve that information. 
The copyright issues relating to Google Book must be analyzed in two 
distinct parts: first, the intermediate copying which produces metadata; and 
second, the copying and displaying of fragments of books along with search 
results.  The construction of the Google Book database involves the actual 
copying of millions of expressive works for an intermediate purpose that is 
itself entirely nonexpressive.  In this regard, it is exactly analogous to pla-
giarism detection software.208  However, while the process of generating da-
ta itself is not an expressive use, the search engine linked to that data does 
provide expressive snippets of copyrighted books to end users in response 
to their search requests.  
Does this mean that the intermediate copying performed by Google 
should be deemed to be expressive in nature?  Although the search engine 
displays expressive snippets of books to end users, in most cases those 
snippets are too fragmented and insubstantial to amount to infringing copies 
of the books themselves.  It is conceivable that a three line snippet of a hai-
ku could be infringing by itself, but for most books, the notion that any 
three lines could meet the test of substantial similarity is risible.209  Howev-
er, if Google Book‘s snippets were less abbreviated, they might be coherent 
and substantial enough to be infringing.  As long as Google Book‘s final 
expressive use does not infringe, it should not detract from the nonexpres-
siveness of an intermediate use.210   
In sum, although Internet search engines (and possibly even the Google 
Book project) are strong candidates for nonexpressive use, the extent to 
which that label actually fits may depend on a detailed assessment of specif-
ic facts.  For example, the claim of nonexpressive use in relation to an im-
age search engine that reproduced full-scale images as opposed to 
thumbnails would be doubtful.  The categorization of intermediate nonex-
pressive uses intertwined with infringing expressive uses is also ambiguous.  
To ameliorate this problem, courts should evaluate claims of nonexpressive 
use within the context of a fair use analysis rather than adopting a categori-
cal rule.  Section C addresses the links between nonexpressive use and fair 
use in detail.  
                                                                                                                           
REQUIREMENTS FOR BIBLIOGRAPHIC RECORDS, FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BIBLIOGRAPHIC 
RECORDS, FINAL REPORT (1998), http://www.ifla.org/files/cataloguing/frbr/frbr.pdf. 
208
  Google‘s process for generating the metadata behind its book search engine is also clearly ana-
logous to the intermediate copying approved by numerous federal courts in reverse engineering cases.  
See Sag, supra note 4, at 425–28.  
209
  Note that Google Book treats works such as poetry, dictionaries, drug reference guides, price 
guides, and books of quotations differently for this very reason.  See Google Book Settlement, available 
at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/help/bin/answer.py?answer=118722 (last visited Aug. 4, 
2009). 
210
  Whether a converse finding that an end product infringes requires treating an intermediate non-
expressive use as expressive is a question for another day. 
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C. Fair Use and Nonexpressive Use  
Copyright law does not require a radical reinterpretation to accommo-
date the principle of nonexpressive use.  It merely requires applying the ex-
isting elements of fair use doctrine to recognize that acts of copying that do 
not communicate the author‘s original expression to the public do not typi-
cally constitute copyright infringement.  
The Copyright Act requires courts to consider four factors in making a 
fair use determination.  These factors are:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of 
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.211 
In reality, these factors are neither complete212 nor individually or cumula-
tively determinative.213  Even the notion that there are four factors is mis-
leading: beneath the statutory factors lies an amalgamation of 
interconnected metafactors, subfactors, and presumptions.  The implications 
of nonexpressive use in relation to fair use are explored below.  
1. The ―Purpose and Character‖ of Nonexpressive Uses.—The non-
expressive nature of the defendant‘s use is perhaps most clearly relevant 
under the first fair use factor, ―the purpose and character of the use, includ-
ing whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes.‖214  Recognizing the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights as 
implicitly defined and limited in reference to expressive communication to 
the public makes sense of both expressive and nonexpressive fair uses.  In-
deed, recognition of this overarching principle may be the key to rescuing 
the concept of transformative use from elastic imprecision.  
According to the Supreme Court‘s most recent fair use decision, 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the first factor turns primarily on:  
[W]hether the new use merely supersedes the objects of the original crea-
tion . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
 
 
 
211
  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
212
  See Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2003) (―These factors are not meant to be exclu-
sive, but rather illustrative, representing only general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and 
Congress most commonly have found to be fair uses.‖) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 448 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (―The factors 
are illustrative, not definitive.‖). 
213
  See Sag, supra note 4, at 434; see also Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to 
Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1564 (2004); David Nimmer, ―Fairest of Them All‖ and Oth-
er Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 281 (2003) (―Courts tend first to make a 
judgment that the ultimate disposition is fair use or unfair use, and then align the four factors to fit that 
result as best they can.‖).  
214
  17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
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character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, 
in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is ―transforma-
tive‖. . . . Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a 
finding of fair use, . . . the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is 
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.215 
Traditionally, courts apply the concept of transformative use to new expres-
sive uses that ―provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, 
and, in the process, creat[e] a new one.‖216  Transformative use is most ob-
vious when the work is itself transformed; however, in many cases courts 
have held that the mere recontextualization of a copyrighted work from one 
expressive context to another is sufficient to sustain a finding of fair use—
the work itself need not be altered.217  Understanding the rationale for trans-
formative use is the key to grasping the link between transformative use and 
nonexpressive use.  The privileged status of transformative uses under the 
fair use doctrine allows for the creation of new works from old.  This is not 
a sufficient explanation, however, because other doctrinal levers, such as a 
narrower understanding of the author‘s exclusive right to make derivative 
works, could achieve the same effect.218  Beyond a simple enthusiasm for 
new works, courts accord special status to transformative uses because they 
do not substitute for the author‘s original expression—they do not merely 
supersede the objects of the original creation.219  Because of this special sta-
tus, the greater the extent of transformation, the less significant other factors 
weighing against fair use will become.220 
Cognizant of the Supreme Court‘s focus on transformative uses, some 
courts have simply equated nonexpressive with transformative.  In Perfect 
10, the court held that Google‘s use of thumbnails in its Internet search en-
gine ―may be more transformative than a parody because a search engine 
provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a parody typically 
has the same entertainment purpose as the original work.‖221  This seems to 
 
 
 
215
  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) (―I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on wheth-
er, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.‖). 
216
  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
217
  See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(use of promotional posters in a rock biography was ―a purpose separate and distinct from the original 
artistic and promotional purpose for which the images were created‖); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain 
Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796–98, 800–06 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that photos parodying Barbie by de-
picting ―nude Barbie dolls juxtaposed with vintage kitchen appliances‖ was a fair use).  
218
  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). 
219
  See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
220
  Id.  
221
  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding further that 
―even making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the copy serves a different 
function than the original work.‖ (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 
2003)). 
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be stretching the concept of transformation beyond its natural utility.  It 
would be better to recognize that uses which do not relate to the expressive 
appeal of a work may find favor under the first fair use factor—whether 
they qualify as transformative in the expressive sense or not.  
By construction, the more nonexpressive the use of a copyrighted work 
is, the less it substitutes for the author‘s original expression.222  As such, 
courts should regard primarily nonexpressive uses as equivalent (but not 
identical) to highly transformative uses—their ―purpose and character‖ is 
such that they do not merely supersede the objects of the original crea-
tion.223  In addition, the same logic that dictates that the more transformative 
a work is, the less significant the other factors become, also applies to non-
expressive uses.224  
2. Nonexpressive Use and Commercial Fair Use.—As part of their 
consideration of the first factor—―the purpose and character of the use‖—
courts are instructed to consider ―whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for nonprofit educational purposes.‖225  Although the application 
of the fair use doctrine to commercial entities has been uncertain for some 
time, due deference to the Supreme Court‘s most recent pronouncement on 
the issue and the economic logic of copyright both suggest that commercial-
ity has no per se relevance.  The status of commercial fair use has proved to 
be confusing, in part because it is so closely linked with the question of 
market substitution under the fourth factor.226  Conceiving of copyright as a 
set of exclusive rights in relation to the communication of original expres-
sion to the public sheds considerable light on the status of commercial uses 
under the fair use doctrine.  The fact that most copy-reliant technologies are 
developed and maintained by commercial entities does not weaken their 
claim to fair use.  As explained in more detail below, if a use is nonexpres-
sive, its commercial or noncommercial nature is irrelevant because nonex-
pressive uses do not substitute for the author‘s original expression. 
In both Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. and Har-
per & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that commercial uses are disfavored under the fair use doctrine.227  
Writing for the majority in Sony, Justice Stevens suggested that if Sony‘s 
 
 
 
222
  The analysis in this section is subject to the caveat regarding computer software and other quasi-
functional works discussed in Part II.A.5.  
223
  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.  
224
  See id. at 579.  
225
  17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006). 
226
  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit‘s approach to commerciality in Napster defines the concept exclusive-
ly in terms of market substitution.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that ―commercial use is demonstrated by a showing that repeated and exploitative 
unauthorized copies of copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing authorized cop-
ies‖). 
227
  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).  
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video cassette recorder ―were used to make copies for a commercial or prof-
it-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair.  The contrary 
presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court‘s find-
ings plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be cha-
racterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.‖228  Similarly, the 
majority in Harper & Row declared that ―[t]he fact that a publication was 
commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh 
against a finding of fair use.‖229  
However, as the Court later discovered in Campbell, a fixed presump-
tion against commercial fair use is difficult to reconcile with the economic 
logic of copyright.  As the Court has reaffirmed most recently in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, copyright promotes the creation and publication of free expression 
―[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of one‘s expression.‖230  As 
Neil Netanel observes, the great virtue of copyright is that it ―supports a 
sector of creative and communicative activity that is relatively free from re-
liance on state subsidy, elite patronage, and cultural hierarchy.‖231  The vir-
tues of creative production freed from the shackles of patronage and direct 
government control apply equally to all forms of private production, regard-
less of whether they rely on the fair use doctrine or not.  Thus, the economic 
and political logic of copyright is inconsistent with placing special burdens 
on the private sector for no other reason than its pursuit of profit.  Non-
commercial uses may have other characteristics, such as a greater degree of 
spillovers, which justify fair use,232 but there are no inherent differences be-
tween the uses of commercial and noncommercial actors.  In a modern free 
market economy, most copyrighted works of interest to the public at large 
are created by private commercial actors.  Newspapers, television broad-
casts, and Internet search engines are predominantly commercial, and even 
though many schools and universities are often operated by ―not for profit‖ 
corporations, they are still commercial in the sense that they operate on a 
fee-for-service basis.  As the Supreme Court recognized in Campbell, ―[if] 
commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the 
presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the 
preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, 
 
 
 
228
  Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.  ―Time-shifting‖ refers to the consumer practice of recording a program 
to be viewed at a later, more convenient time.  Id. at 418. 
229
  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. 
230
  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558). 
231
  Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 
(1996). 
232
  See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 261 (2007); 
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Per-
mission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 51–53 (1997). 
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teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities ‗are generally 
conducted for profit in this country.‘‖233  
The Court in Campbell rejected the notion that commerciality by itself 
had any ―hard presumptive significance.‖234  Instead, the Court adopted a 
sliding scale to commercial use, arguing that because ―the goal of copy-
right, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation 
of transformative works,‖ then ―the more transformative the new work, the 
less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may 
weigh against a finding of fair use.‖235  This sliding scale approach to com-
mercial uses makes sense in light of the principle of expressive substitution 
articulated in this Article.  The hallmark of transformative works protected 
by the fair use doctrine is that they do not substitute for the author‘s original 
expression, but rather ―add[] something new, with a further purpose or dif-
ferent character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage.‖236  Courts should treat commercial nonexpressive uses similarly: the 
more nonexpressive a use is, the less it is capable of substituting for the au-
thor‘s original expression.  
There is ready support for this position in the case law.  In Kelly v. Ar-
riba Soft Corp., an image search case preceding Perfect 10, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that the replication of copyrighted images in thumbnails would 
not substitute for the full-sized images.237  The court in Perfect 10 likewise 
concluded that Google‘s thumbnail representations were unlikely to inter-
fere with the market for Perfect 10‘s original expression.238  The court ex-
pressly rejected the application of any commerciality inference or 
presumption, noting that ―this presumption does not arise when a work is 
transformative because market substitution is at least less certain, and mar-
ket harm may not be so readily inferred.‖239  
3. Nonexpressive Use and ―Amount and Substantiality.‖—The degr- 
ee to which a use is nonexpressive is also significant in terms of the third 
fair use factor, ―the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
 
 
 
233
  510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
3 BOSWELL‘S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed. 1934)) (other citations omitted). 
234
  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585.  
235
  Id. at 579 (citations omitted).  As Barton Beebe notes, while commentators have assumed that 
the commerciality presumption was finally discarded in Campbell, it remains a tenacious meme in the 
court of public opinion.  See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 598 (2008).  
236
  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see Leval supra note 215, at 1111 (―If . . . the secondary use adds 
value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the 
fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.‖). 
237
  Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003). 
238
  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 724 (9th Cir. 2007).  
239
  Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to the copyrighted work as a whole.‖240  This factor eschews mechanical 
quantification and recognizes that the amount of tolerable copying varies 
according to both the purpose of the defendant‘s use and the effect of that 
use on the copyright owner.  The issue at the heart of the third factor is not 
simply what percentage of the copyright owner‘s original work has been 
taken, but what proportion of the work‘s expressive value has been appro-
priated.  The argument made here is simply that a use properly categorized 
as nonexpressive does not substitute for the any of the expressive value of 
the author‘s original expression. 
Even in the realm of expressive uses, there is no linear relationship be-
tween the amount of a work copied and its propensity to fair use.  All other 
things being equal, the more a defendant copies, the more likely she is to in-
terfere with the copyright owner‘s right to market her works to the public.  
Thus, Napster users who trade complete copies of copyrighted music over 
the Internet are treated very differently from collage artists who copy only 
parts of works and add their own significant creative input.241  But all other 
things are rarely equal, and courts have repeatedly found that even total co-
pying of expressive works can be fair use in the right circumstances.  
Courts have held that total copying is permissible in personal use cases, 
such as those testing the legality of the video cassette recorder and the mp3 
player.242  In cases relating to photography and other visual works, courts 
have occasionally allowed defendants to reproduce entire images where it 
was unlikely that any market harm would result and the defendant‘s pur-
pose required complete reproduction.243  
 
 
 
240
  17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).  This inquiry can be traced back to Justice Story‘s original formula-
tion of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).  In that 
case, Justice Story was concerned to protect the ―chief value of the original work‖ against the extraction 
of its ―essential parts‖ through the mere ―facile use of scissors‖ or its intellectual equivalent.  Id at 345.  
241
  Compare A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2001) (―Nap-
ster users are not fair users.‖), with Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the visu-
al artist Jeff Koons‘s use of fashion photography in collage was fair use). 
242
  See Recording Indus. Ass‘n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding that personal digital music players are legal); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984) (holding that videotape recorders, primarily used for time shift-
ing, are legal); cf. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that modifying the way in which an entirely copied video game is played is legal in just the same 
way as video recorders that allow the viewer to view the recorded work in a different sequence are le-
gal).  
243
  See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding 
that total copying ―does not necessarily weigh against fair use because copying the entirety of a work is 
sometimes necessary to make a fair use of the image‖); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 
(9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that images used for a search engine database are necessarily copied in their 
entirety for the purpose of recognition); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that ―entire verbatim reproductions are justifiable where the purpose of the work dif-
fers from the original‖); Nunez v. Caribbean Int‘l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (conclud-
ing that to copy any less than the entire image at issue would have made the picture useless to the story). 
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Far from being linear or arithmetic in nature, proper application of the 
third factor is contingent upon the purpose and the effect of the defendant‘s 
use.  As the Supreme Court recognized in Campbell, ―the extent of permiss-
ible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use.‖244  In that 
case, the Court held that the degree to which rap musicians 2 Live Crew had 
copied from Roy Orbison‘s original song, Pretty Woman, must be assessed 
in light of their parodic purpose.  Because the art of parody ―lies in the ten-
sion between a known original and its parodic twin,‖ parody requires copy-
ing enough of the original so that the object of derision is made clear to the 
audience.245  Just as the extent of permissible copying varies according to 
purpose, it also varies according to effect.  In Harper & Row, the defendant 
magazine, The Nation, copied only a few hundred words from a soon-to-be-
published autobiography of former President Gerald Ford.  The Supreme 
Court held, however, that this constituted a substantial taking under the 
third factor because The Nation had selected its quotes ―precisely because 
they qualitatively embodied Ford‘s distinctive expression,‖ had taken ―the 
most interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript,‖ and had struc-
tured its article around these quoted excerpts.246  The Court‘s finding in rela-
tion to the third factor rests on the finding that The Nation had taken 
essentially the heart of the book‘s expressive value.247  
Instead of relying on a mechanical quantification of the amount of the 
original work used, the third factor asks courts to assess how much of the 
value of the original work is present in the allegedly infringing work.248  
Accordingly, the extent to which a use is nonexpressive plays a vital role in 
the assessment of the third fair use factor.  A nonexpressive use does not 
generally substitute for the expressive value of the author‘s original expres-
sion, and therefore courts should view it as qualitatively insignificant under 
the third factor, even if it involves literal copying of an entire work.  
Again, existing case law is consistent with this proposition.  In Perfect 
10, the court held that although the thumbnails were copies of the original 
images, their reduced size and image quality was consistent with their use 
as pointing devices, which did not substitute for the expressive value of the 
author‘s original expression.249  Consistent with its earlier decision in Kelly, 
the court found that the representation of an entire photographic image was 
 
 
 
244
  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87. 
245
  Id. at 588. 
246
  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
247
  Id. at 566 (―In view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key role in the infringing 
work, we cannot agree with the Second Circuit that the magazine took a meager, indeed an infinitesimal 
amount of Ford‘s original language.‖). 
248
  See Sag, supra note 4, at 391. 
249
  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721–22 (9th Cir. 2007) (―Here, Google uses 
Perfect 10‘s images in a new context to serve a different purpose.‖). 
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reasonable in light of the purpose of an image search engine.250  As the court 
explained, while a user can identify relevant text by seeing merely a frac-
tion of it, understanding the relevance of an image requires seeing a repre-
sentation of the complete image.251  In Perfect 10, as in Kelly, the court 
found that the third fair use factor did not weigh in favor of either party.252  
Likewise, in Field, the court found that making entire web pages avail-
able in the search engine cache served a purpose that could not be effective-
ly accomplished by using only portions of the web pages.  The court found 
that Google‘s nonexpressive uses of the cached pages—such as verifying 
the authenticity of live pages and assessing the relevance of search que-
ries—required caching complete reproductions of the plaintiff‘s web pages.  
Accordingly, the district court concluded that because ―Google uses no 
more of the works than is necessary in allowing access to them through 
‗Cached‘ links, the third fair use factor is neutral, despite the fact that 
Google allowed access to the entirety of Field‘s works.‖253 
Furthermore, the numerous copyright cases dealing with the practice of 
reverse engineering computer software also support the proposition that a 
nonexpressive use is qualitatively insignificant under the third factor.  In 
Sony v. Connectix, for example, the court acknowledged that Connectix had 
copied an entire section of Sony‘s software multiple times; however, it con-
cluded that ―in a case of intermediate infringement when the final product 
does not itself contain infringing material, this factor is of very little 
weight.‖254  
The third factor requires a holistic assessment of the extent of appropr-
iation of a work‘s expressive value, measured against the need and justifica-
tion of the defendant in appropriating it.  Accordingly, courts frown upon 
nontransformative expressive uses of a copyrighted work, but grant consi-
derable latitude to transformative expressive uses.  Similarly, nonexpressive 
uses, even those that require total copying, should be generally deemed to 
be qualitatively insignificant because they do not substitute for the expres-
sive value of the author‘s original expression.  
4. The Market Effect of Nonexpressive Uses.—The fourth fair use fa- 
ctor is ―the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.‖255  The Harper & Row Court described the fourth fair 
 
 
 
250
  Id. at 724 (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003)).  
251
  Id.  
252
  Id.; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821. 
253
  Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (D. Nev. 2006).  Presumably, the court would 
have come to a different conclusion if it found that the primary use of cached links was to substitute for 
the original web page.  
254
  Sony Computer Entm‘t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal qu-
otation marks omitted).  
255
  17 U.S.C. § 107(41) (2006). 
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use factor as ―undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.‖256  
Barton Beebe, in contrast, concludes that the fourth factor is ―no factor at 
all.‖257  As detailed below, although the fourth factor risks collapsing into 
circularity because everything is a potential market effect, courts have in 
fact avoided this nadir by applying certain limiting principles that emphas-
ize that the copyright market is limited to expressive substitution.  The logi-
cal implication of the exclusion of economic consequences that do not arise 
from expressive substitution is that to the extent that a use is nonexpressive, 
it typically has no cognizable market effect under the fourth factor.  
The first step in ascertaining the market effect of an unauthorized use 
is to define the relevant market.  If the market is defined purely in terms of 
that which might be licensed if the law says that it must be licensed, then 
the fair use ruling collapses into circularity.258  The concept of market effect 
becomes even more elusive if a trial judge adopts the Harper & Row 
Court‘s slippery slope presumption.  In Harper & Row, the Court an-
nounced that ―to negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged 
use should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential mar-
ket for the copyrighted work.‖259  The aggregation of any harm that is likely 
to result from widespread use is reasonable in evaluating the fourth factor.  
The Court, however, offers no particular reason to presume that all uses 
will become widespread.260  
Combining the slippery slope of aggregation with a broad concept of 
derivative works, copyright owners frequently claim that almost any new 
use of their work—either in whole or in part—is part of an unexplored de-
rivative market.261  Taken at face value it becomes impossible for a defen-
dant to prove that her particular use, if widely replicated, would not displace 
 
 
 
256
  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
257
  Beebe, supra note 235, at 620–21 (―Ultimately, the paradox of the fourth factor is that it is eve-
rything in the fair use test and thus nothing.  To assert, as a descriptive matter, that it is the most impor-
tant factor—or, as a normative matter, that it is too important—is meaningless, primarily because it is no 
factor, no independent variable, at all.‖) (footnote omitted). 
258
  James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
882, 947–51 (2007).  But note that although Gibson describes a one-way ratchet effect, the potential cir-
cularity of the fourth factor can be set to spin in either direction: if the use is fair, there is no need to li-
cense and thus no harm to the market, thus the use is fair; but equally, if the use is unfair, there is 
axiomatically at least one potential licensee (the defendant), and thus the copyright owner‘s market has 
been adversely affected. 
259
  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
260
  This is arguably a distortion of the Senate Report, which comments that ―Isolated instances of 
minor infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on copyright 
that must be prevented.‖  S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 65 (1975) (emphasis added).  Note that in Campbell the 
slippery slope presumption is weakened to a matter for consideration, but still without any analysis of 
which uses are likely to become widespread and which are not.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc,. 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
261
  For example, although it had shown no interest in licensing a derivative of Pretty Woman in the 
rap genre before its lawsuit against 2 Live Crew, Acuff-Rose (Roy Orbison‘s publisher) argued that 2 
Live Crew‘s parody diminished its potential to do so.  See id. 
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some potential future market in some derivative of the copyright owner‘s 
work.  As the Second Circuit noted in American Geophysical Union v. Tex-
aco Inc., ―were a court automatically to conclude in every case that poten-
tial licensing revenues were impermissibly impaired simply because the 
secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, the fourth 
fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.‖262 
Courts avoid this potential circularity by adopting a number of limiting 
principles in relation to the fourth factor.  First, the unlikelihood of a deriva-
tive market may limit its relevance: ―The market for potential derivative 
uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general 
develop or license others to develop.‖263  Second, fair use cases often turn 
on the simple question of whether the particular market claimed by the 
plaintiff is one that is cognizable under copyright.  This is not merely a 
question for the fourth factor; it permeates consideration of all of the fac-
tors.  The market harms that courts refuse to recognize illustrate again that 
the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights are limited to the communication of 
their original expression to the public.  This principle is reflected in the 
seemingly unrelated cases involving parody and the reverse engineering of 
computer software.  In both scenarios, courts exclude consideration of mar-
ket effects that do not arise from expressive substitution. 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court quite plainly differentiated the copy-
right owner‘s general economic interests from the limited protection af-
forded by copyright:  
[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the 
original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.  Be-
cause parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it 
commercially as well as artistically, the role of the courts is to distinguish be-
tween biting criticism that merely suppresses demand and copyright infringe-
ment, which usurps it.264 
Just as Campbell recognizes that criticism is outside of the copyright own-
er‘s protectable sphere of interest, the reverse engineering cases recognize 
that the copyright owner has no protectable interest in preventing the copy-
ing of unprotectable expression and ideas buried within its object code.  
Courts have consistently held that making unauthorized copies of a com-
puter program, as a necessary step in reverse engineering, is fair use.265  For 
 
 
 
262
  60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Leval, supra note 215, at 1124 
(―By definition every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because the secondary user has not 
paid royalties.‖). 
263
  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. 
264
  Id. at 591–92 (quoting, in part, Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986); BENJAMIN 
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 69 (1967)) (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted). 
265
  See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm‘t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000) (holding that Connectix‘s copying of Sony‘s copyrighted basic input–
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example, in Sony v. Connectix, the Ninth Circuit held that although the de-
fendant‘s Virtual Game Station console directly competed with Sony in the 
market for platforms capable of playing Sony Playstation games, the Virtual 
Game Station was a ―legitimate competitor‖ in that market.266  The court 
concluded that Sony‘s desire to control the market for gaming platforms 
was understandable, but that ―copyright law . . . does not confer such a mo-
nopoly.‖267  
Both parody and reverse engineering cases illustrate the exclusion of 
market effects that do not arise from expressive substitution.  This rationale 
is most explicit in the reverse engineering cases.  From the beginning of its 
decision in Sony v. Connectix, the court emphasized the importance of the 
idea–expression distinction: ―We are called upon once again to apply the 
principles of copyright law to computers and their software, to determine 
what must be protected as expression and what must be made accessible to 
the public as function.‖268  Consistent with its decision in Sega Enterprises 
v. Accolade, Inc.,269 the Ninth Circuit held in Sony that intermediate copying 
of software is fair use if the copying was necessary to gain access to the 
functional elements of the software.270  The court based its ruling firmly on 
the importance of maintaining the idea–expression distinction: ―We drew 
this distinction because the Copyright Act protects expression only, not 
ideas or the functional aspects of a software program . . . .  Thus, the fair 
use doctrine preserves public access to the ideas and functional elements 
embedded in copyrighted computer software programs.‖271  As in the paro-
dy cases—although for different reasons—the reverse engineering cases ex-
clude consideration of market effects that do not arise from expressive 
substitution.  
In the case of expressive uses such as parody, and nonexpressive uses 
such as reverse engineering, courts have consistently held that the protec-
tion that copyright affords is limited to certain cognizable markets.  Trans-
                                                                                                                           
output system (BIOS) during reverse engineering, used by Connectix to develop a software program that 
emulates the functioning of the Sony PlayStation console for regular computers, was fair use); Atari 
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842–43 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (observing that Atari‘s 
reverse engineering of Nintendo‘s 10NES program would have been a fair use of the program, except 
that Atari did not possess an authorized copy of the work); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 
1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Accolade‘s reverse engineering of Sega‘s video game programs 
in order to figure out how to make its own games compatible with Sega‘s Genesis system is a fair use); 
see also David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 601 n.19 (2004) (collecting cases).  Circumventing encryption for the pur-
pose of reverse engineering is also allowed under the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA.  See 
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006). 
266
  203 F.3d at 607; see also Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522–23. 
267
  Sony, 203 F.3d at 607; see also Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523–24. 
268
  203 F.3d at 598. 
269
  977 F.2d 1510. 
270
  Sony, 203 F.3d at 607. 
271
  Id. at 603 (citing Sega, 997 F.2d 1510).  
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formative expressive uses do not usually affect the market in any relevant 
sense because the second author‘s expression does not substitute for that of 
the original author.  The absence of any cognizable market effect is even 
more apparent in cases of nonexpressive use because, to the degree that a 
particular use is nonexpressive, it has literally no potential substitution ef-
fect on a cognizable copyright market.  
 
 * * * 
 
As established earlier in this Part, the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner typically hinge upon the communication of original expression to the 
public.  Acts of copying which do not communicate the author‘s original 
expression to the public should not generally be held to constitute copyright 
infringement.  The application of this principle to anomalous copyright sub-
ject matter must be considered carefully.  Rightly or wrongly, Congress has 
extended copyright protection to computer software and architectural plans 
in order to provide incentives for the development of these primarily func-
tional objects.  As already conceded, while computer programs are treated 
as expressive literary works, their expressive elements may be secondary to 
the nonprotectable functional output of the program—i.e., what it actually 
does.  In consequence, the everyday use of a computer program is nonex-
pressive, but that does not suggest that copyright protection for software 
should be effectively dismantled.  Instead, courts must exercise caution 
when dealing with anomalous copyright subject matter so as not to negate 
the very protection Congress intended.  
The most appropriate method of doctrinal incorporation of the prin-
ciple of nonexpressive use is through the fair use doctrine.  The role of ex-
pressive substitution is not merely compatible with the fair use doctrine; it 
is actually necessary to make sense of much existing case law.  It may be 
unrealistic to attempt to reduce the entirety of fair use jurisprudence into 
any one coherent principle.  Nonetheless, the general proposition that the 
doctrine favors acts of copying that are unlikely to substitute for the copy-
right owner‘s original expression explains the majority of cases.  Like trans-
formative expressive uses, primarily nonexpressive uses should generally 
be classified as fair uses because, by their very nature, they do not substitute 
for the author‘s original expression.  Accordingly, like transformative use, 
nonexpressive use should be favored under the first, third, and fourth fac-
tors—such uses are nonsubstitutive in ―purpose and character,‖ appropriate 
a qualitatively insignificant proportion of the value of the copyright owner‘s 
original expression, and produce no cognizable market effect under the 
fourth factor.272  
 
 
 
272
  As is so often the case, the second statutory factor does not appear to have much bite in the con-
text of nonexpressive uses, and thus does little to ―separat[e] the fair use sheep from the infringing 
goats.‖  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).   
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III. THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
Copyright disputes involving copy-reliant technology may be com-
pletely resolved once a court determines that the use in question is nonex-
pressive.  However, there are nonetheless two reasons for delving further 
into the issues of transaction costs and opt-outs that preoccupy this final 
Part.  First, opt-outs are a common feature of copy-reliant technology and 
their ubiquity deserves some explanation.  Second, although the correct ap-
plication of the nonexpressive use principle expounded in this Article will 
be clear in many cases, it may not be clear-cut in every case.  In those cases 
where ambiguity persists, courts will have to consider the totality of the de-
fendant‘s fair use claim.  In that context, the defendant‘s opt-out mechanism 
takes on considerable significance.  Section A begins with an explanation of 
why copy-reliant technologies face significant transaction costs problems 
and the role of opt-out mechanisms in reducing those transaction costs.  
Section B discusses the relationship between transaction costs and the form 
and content of property rights generally.  Section C then specifically ad-
dresses how and why the use of opt-outs by copy-reliant technologies is re-
levant to a fair use analysis.  
A. Transaction Costs and Copy-Reliant Technologies  
The transaction costs faced by copy-reliant technologies are different 
in kind and in magnitude to those pertaining to analog works.  Often, the 
sheer number of transactions that must typically be accommodated by copy-
reliant technologies makes the transaction costs problems they face unique.  
The irony of copy-reliant technology is that, while technology has helped 
reduce the per unit transaction cost in relation to some discrete objects, such 
as motion pictures and sound recordings, the proliferation of copyrighted 
content means that total transaction costs for any technology that must cov-
er the whole of the Internet have increased dramatically.  While private or-
dering through collective rights management may be a common solution in 
various fields of intellectual property, it does not necessarily offer a solu-
tion in the context of copy-reliant technologies due to the scale, decentrali-
zation, and heterogeneity of the Internet.  Nonetheless, Internet 
entrepreneurs have found other ways to address transaction costs, primarily 
through the combination of well understood default rules and technological-
ly enabled opt-out mechanisms.  These issues are now addressed in detail.   
1. Scale, Diversity, and Decentralization.—The sheer scale of the In-
ternet is truly daunting.  No technology since the printing press has given 
rise to a proliferation of copyrighted works equivalent to the explosion of 
Internet content witnessed since the mid-1990s.  A simple comparison helps 
illustrate this point.  The U.S. Library of Congress is the world‘s largest li-
brary, with more than 134 million books, photographs, maps, musical 
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works, manuscripts, and other printed materials.273  The volume of material 
available on the Internet has dwarfed this number in a very short period.  
There are now an estimated 1.7 billion Internet users worldwide.274  It is dif-
ficult to estimate the number of web pages available on the world wide web 
at any given time; however, the Internet Archive—which is only a partial 
collection—contains 85 billion searchable pages archived from 1996 to the 
present.275  This number alone exceeds the entire collection of the Library of 
Congress by a ratio of more than 600 to 1.  
The volume of material on the Internet presents a significant transac-
tion cost problem for Internet search technology in particular because the 
value of any search engine grows exponentially with its coverage.  The 
Google Book project and plagiarism detection software confront a similar 
network effect.  The difference between the requirements of copy-reliant 
technologies and other more traditional consumers of copyrighted works is 
illustrated by the contrast between an Internet search engine and a book 
publisher.  To provide a useful product, a book publisher must sift through a 
large number of submitted manuscripts, select one, and negotiate a license 
with the author.  The publisher is fortunate that once she finds one good 
manuscript, there is no need to read the remainder.  Furthermore, if the pub-
lisher‘s preferred author is intransigent in negotiations, she can proceed to 
her second best alternative at very little sacrifice.  In contrast, an Internet 
search engine cannot just select one or two websites under each search term 
and rest on its laurels.  First, search engines must be able to cope with un-
expected queries.  Second, search engines are subject to a significant net-
work effect such that they are only really useful at a threshold of near 
complete coverage.   
The Internet has not only expanded information production, but has 
radically decentralized it as well.  The Gartner consulting firm estimates 
that around 100 million writers actively maintained a personal website or 
blog in 2007.276  Even as the mainstream press continues to consolidate into 
fewer and fewer media empires, the Internet has decentralized news produc-
tion and increased both its volume and its diversity.277  Not only are these 
 
 
 
273
  See The Library of Congress, About the Library, http://www.loc.gov/about/facts.html (last vi-
sited July 29, 2009).  Fewer then 32 million of these items are books.  Id. 
274
  Internet World Stats, World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, 
http://www.Internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).  
275
  The Internet Archive is a nonprofit organization founded to build an Internet library, with the 
purpose of offering permanent access for researchers, historians, and scholars to historical collections 
that exist in digital format.  The Internet Archive, About the Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/ 
about/about.php (last visited June 22, 2009).  
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  Antony Savvas, Gartner‘s Top 10 Forecasts for 2007 and Beyond, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, 
Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2006/12/15/220726/gartners-top-
10-forecasts-for-2007-and-beyond.htm. 
277
  See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 223 (2006); see also Brett M. Frischmann, Cultural Environmentalism and 
The Wealth of Networks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083 (2007). 
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actors decentralized, they are also diverse.278  The ―new media‖ and distri-
buted production exemplified by blogs and social networking sites are cha-
racterized by (1) a blurring of the lines between producers and consumers, 
(2) a significant degree of interaction between participants who are both 
producers and consumers, and (3) low monetary costs, at least for the ma-
jority of participants.279  As a result, the Internet has complicated the eco-
nomics of copyright by expanding the range of viable information 
production strategies.  The proliferation of content producers and their hete-
rogeneity is no doubt beneficial, but it presents copy-reliant technologies 
with a difficult set of transaction cost problems if they intend to clear rights 
before unleashing their automated processes. 
The high transaction cost environment is not limited to Internet search 
engines.  Plagiarism detection software, which must search the whole Inter-
net for possible sources of plagiarism, faces a similar problem of scale.  The 
transaction cost issues in Google Book are similar, but distinct.  Google 
faces substantial costs in building out its database of library books.  There 
are approximately 18 million books in the combined collections of 
Google‘s partner libraries, and each one of these needs to be pulled off a 
shelf, scanned, and reshelved.280  The average cost of scanning each book is 
estimated at around $10.281  In addition to these costs, if Google‘s interme-
diate copying is not fair use, it will also be confronted with a substantial 
rights clearance problem.282  For each book Google will have to (1) deter-
mine whether the book is in the public domain, (2) determine the identity of 
the copyright owner(s), (3) locate the copyright owner(s), and (4) negotiate 
to obtain the permission of the owner(s).  
Google‘s clearance costs will vary according to the book in question: 
broadly speaking, they will be lowest for very old works (pre-1923), modest 
for very new works (2001 onwards), and highest for those in between (1923 
to 2000).283  The clearance costs for very old and very new works are quite 
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  See generally BENKLER, supra note 277 (describing information production in a networked in-
formation economy and its inclusion of a broader range of participants). 
279
  Id. at 91–132. 
280
  Brian Lavoie, Lynn Silipigni Connaway & Lorcan Dempsey, Anatomy of Aggregate Collections: 
The Example of Google Print for Libraries, 11(9) D-LIB MAG., Sept. 2005, available at 
http://www.dlib.org/dlib/september05/lavoie/09lavoie.html. 
281
  See, e.g., Carolyn Said, Revolutionary Chapter; Google‘s Ambitious Book-Scanning Plan Seen 
As Key Shift In Paper-Based Culture, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2004, at F1. (―[P]ress reports have pegged 
it at about $10 per book.‖); see also Eleanor Yang Su, Google Will Post UC Library Books Online For 
Public, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug.10, 2006, at A4 (reporting that the University of California esti-
mates that it would cost it $30 to $40 per book to scan its collection). 
282
  Google‘s recent class settlement with The Authors Guild, Inc., the Association of American 
Publishers, Inc., and the broad class of authors and publishers they represent effectively resolves the 
rights clearance issue for Google Book, as with respect to U.S. copyright interests.  A draft of the pro-
posed Settlement Agreement is available at http://books.google.com/booksrightsholders/agreement-
contents.html.  
283
  The significance of each of these dates is explained below.  
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low.  If a work was published in the United States before January 1, 1923, it 
is safe to assume that is in the public domain.284  The clearance costs for 
very new works are also quite low because publishers now insist on obtain-
ing the relevant rights from authors and are in a position to grant Google 
permission to include these works in its database.285  Recall Tasini, where 
the Supreme Court held in favor of freelance journalists in relation to the 
inclusion and display of their articles in online databases.286  Rather than 
providing the freelance authors who it had already paid once for their ar-
ticles with a new stream of revenue, the Times Company and other publish-
ers simply removed most of the freelance pieces from their online 
databases.  Since Tasini, it has become industry practice to insist on very 
broad rights in relation to electronic storage and retrieval.287   
However, for the vast numbers of books published between 1923 and 
2001, the applicable clearance costs are likely to be quite high.288  First, al-
though it may not be obvious from the date of publication alone, many of 
these works are in fact in the public domain.  The duration of copyright un-
der the 1909 Act was limited to twenty-eight years, plus a renewal period of 
twenty-eight years.289  This renewal period was subsequently extended to 
forty-seven years, and then again to sixty-seven years.290  The result is that 
if a work was published in the United States before 1963 and not renewed, 
it is in the public domain.291  The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 made re-
newal automatic for works first copyrighted between January 1, 1964, and 
December 31, 1977.292  Likewise, certain works may also be in the public 
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  Note that a work created but not published prior to 1978 may not be in the public domain.  See 
generally Elizabeth Townsend Gard, January 1, 2003: The Birth of the Unpublished Public Domain and 
Its International Implications, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687 (2006); R. Anthony Reese, Public but 
Private: Copyright‘s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85 TEX. L. REV. 585 (2007). 
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Partner Program, http://books.google.com/support/partner/bin/answer.py?answer=106167 (last visited 
July 1, 2009); Amazon.com, Search Inside! Participation Agreement, http://www.amazon.com/ gp/html-
forms-controller/SITB_Publisher_Signup_Form (last visited July 1, 2009). 
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  See supra Part II.A.2; N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
287
  See Amy Terry, Tasini Aftermath: The Consequences of the Freelancers‘ Victory, 14 DEPAUL-
LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 231, 238–39 (2004). 
288
  See Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Vera Brittain, Section 104(a) and Section 104A: A Case Study in 
Sorting Out Duration of Foreign Works Under the 1976 Copyright Act 11 (Tulane Public Law Research 
Paper No. 07-09, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015575.  
289
  1909 Act, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81. 
290
  17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1992) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §304(a) (2006)).  
291
  Thanks to the combined efforts of Carnegie Mellon Universal Library Project, Project Guten-
berg, Distributed Proofreaders, and a Google software engineer named Jarkko Hietaniemi, the paper-
based renewal record maintained by the U.S. Copyright Office can now be searched electronically.  See 
Jon Orwant, U.S. Copyright Renewal Records Available for Download, INSIDE GOOGLE BOOKS, June 
23, 2008, http://booksearch.blogspot.com/2008/06/us-copyright-renewal-records-available.html.  
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  Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304 
(2006)). 
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domain because they were published in the United States without the ap-
propriate copyright notice.293  However, the notice requirement only applies 
to works first published before March 1, 1989.294  Additionally, notice de-
fects will not affect a work‘s copyright status if the defective copy was pub-
lished without the authorization of the copyright owner or the notice defect 
only applied to a small number of copies.295  Furthermore, in some circums-
tances it is possible for the author to correct a notice defect.296  It is impor-
tant to note that any work created by a U.S. government employee or officer 
also belongs to the public domain, provided that the person created the 
work in her official capacity.297  The status of unpublished works and the 
works of foreigners adds several additional layers of complexity, including 
the possibility that some works may have been removed from the public 
domain by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994.298  
Second, even if a work remains subject to copyright, the ownership of 
those rights can be highly uncertain.  The basic principle of copyright law is 
that copyright vests initially in the author or authors of the work.299  Howev-
er, those rights may be assigned in an infinite chain of transactions, bank-
ruptcies, and inheritances.  These laws are by no means uniform.  The 
disposition to copyright ownership through a will or intestacy is determined 
by the domicile of the author,300 even if that domicile is in a foreign coun-
try.301  Furthermore, unvested renewal rights under the 1909 Copyright Act 
and rights of termination under the 1976 Copyright Act pass according to 
complex statutory provisions, which may, or may not, mirror the author‘s 
 
 
 
293
  In this regard, the requirement for copyright notice functions as an opt-in.  See Christopher 
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2004) (discussing the role of copy-
right formalities in ―facilitat[ing] licensing by lowering the cost of identifying rightsholders‖). 
294
  17 U.S.C. §§ 401–02 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401–02 (2006)) (prior to the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act).  Note that whether a work was in fact ―published‖ turns on a number 
of factual questions.  See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.04 for a general discussion.  
295
  Communication ―to a definitely selected group, and for a limited purpose, without the right of 
diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale . . .‖ without a copyright notice does not inject a work into 
the public domain.  Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 698, 710 
(D. Minn. 1987), aff‘d, 876 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.13[A]).  Pub-
lication can be especially ambiguous for copies of letters deposited with a library.  
296
  17 U.S.C. § 405 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 405 (2006)) (prior to the Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act). 
297
  See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). 
298
  The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 restores copyright protection to certain foreign 
works which had fallen into the public domain due to failure to comply with formalities, but which 
would otherwise now be eligible for protection in the United States.  See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)(i) 
(2006).  
299
  17 U.S.C. § 201(a).  This is subject to the work for hire doctrine and the possibility of joint au-
thorship.  Id. at § 201(b), (c).  
300
  17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1). 
301
  Brecht v. Bentley, 185 F. Supp. 890, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (―It by no means follows that because 
a proprietor under American Copyright Law is given no rights against an infringing foreign publication 
that his rights of ownership may not descend by the law of a foreign domicile.‖). 
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will or the default positions of her domicile.302  Beyond the name of the ini-
tial author, the work discloses almost none of the facts relevant to determin-
ing the current ownership of copyright.  The records of the U.S. Copyright 
Office also fail to contain the necessary information.  As the work ages, the 
complexity of these legal and factual issues multiplies exponentially.   
Third, Google faces significant costs related to opportunism and stra-
tegic behavior.  As discussed in more detail below, even authors who favor 
inclusion in the Google Book database may have an incentive to hold out 
for higher payment if their copyright gives them an effective veto over the 
project.303  
How significant are these costs likely to be? There are an estimated 18 
million books in the combined collections of the libraries participating in 
the Google Book project.  Approximately 10.5 million of these books are 
unique—they are only held by one of the participating libraries.304  It is es-
timated that slightly less than 20% of these works were published before 
1923 and thus likely present no copyright issues.305  That leaves about 8.4 
million books with some potential copyright constraint.  Even if the average 
clearance cost (the cost of determining the status of the book, finding the re-
levant copyright owners, and negotiating a license) were as little as $200, 
the total cost of rights clearance before any royalties have been paid would 
be over a billion dollars.  It is easy to imagine that clearance costs could be 
in the thousands, not merely the hundreds, in which case the total cost of 
proactively clearing rights on every book could exceed $10 billion.  This 
does not include any royalties paid to authors.  As these very preliminary 
estimates show, the problem of high transaction costs is common to most 
copy-reliant technologies and is not limited to Internet search engines. 
2. Technology Reduces Some Transaction Costs While Increasing 
Others.—Advances in technology have reduced transaction costs in many 
areas by reducing the cost of communication and increasing the effective-
ness of searching.  Such advances, however, have done little to offset the 
significant transaction costs problems faced by copy-reliant technologies.  
Commentators have been predicting the death of fair use on the Internet 
since the late 1990s.  Specifically, the prediction was that digital rights 
management technology (DRM) would allow copyright owners to automat-
ically enforce their rights and to prevent uses that were once considered 
fair.306  Those who embraced the death of fair use online argued that DRM 
 
 
 
302
  See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 209, 221 (1990) (holding that 
even if an author has assigned renewal rights, ―the assignee holds nothing if the author dies before the 
commencement of the renewal period‖).  
303
  See infra note 383 and accompanying text. 
304
  Lavoie, Connaway & Dempsey, supra note 280. 
305
  Id. 
306
  See generally Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management 
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001).  DRM refers to access control technologies that limit the use 
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would allow copyright owners to define the permissions associated with 
their works and make it possible to charge different prices to different users, 
thus reducing the need for fair use.307  Those who feared the death of fair 
use made the same prediction, arguing that that the control facilitated by 
DRM would enable an end run around the public policy values embedded 
in copyright law.308 
Those predictions have proven to be extravagant.  DRM permission 
systems have had a muted impact on DVDs and digital music, and no im-
pact whatsoever on the majority of transactions relevant to copy-reliant 
technologies.  The effect of DRM in the context of DVDs and digital music 
has been muted because permissions systems are fragile and hard to main-
tain for at least two reasons.  First, once the encryption on any one copy of 
a work is broken, that copy can be used to propagate an infinite number of 
unencrypted copies.  Second, users tend to gravitate toward unrestricted 
formats precisely because they offer fewer restrictions.309  The network ef-
fects of this preference for unrestricted formats mean that content providers 
are only in a position to impose permission systems if they are able to con-
trol both the content format and the playback technology.  Content provid-
ers have been partially successful in developing permissions systems with 
respect to DVDs, but similar attempts with respect to audio CDs have been 
                                                                                                                           
of digital media or devices.  See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 177–200 (1995). 
307
  See Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 133, 137 
(2003) (―For the great bulk of uses previously excused because of transaction costs, the [fair use] doc-
trine will simply become irrelevant.‖); see also Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of 
Automated Rights Management on Copyright‘s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 580–84 (1998) 
(same); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 233 
(same); Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 880, 881 (1999) (same); 
Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the ―Newtonian‖ World of On-
Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130–32 (1997) (same).  See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Au-
thors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 1, 15 (1997) (―[T]he primary justification 
for exempting private copying as fair use has been transaction costs, but these are much attenuated in the 
digital world.‖). 
308
  See Burk & Cohen, supra note 306; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Dig-
ital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 814 
(2001). 
309
  Both Apple and Amazon have adopted this strategy.  See Press Release, Apple.com, Apple Un-
veils Higher Quality DRM-Free Music on the iTunes Store, (Apr. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html; Evan Blass, Amazon Announces DRM-Free 
MP3 Music Store, ENGADGET, May 16, 2007, http://www.engadget.com/2007/05/16/amazon-
announces-drm-free-mp3-music-store.  Note also that consumers may distrust DRM because of a poten-
tial lack of backwards compatibility.  For example, music bought from Microsoft‘s MSN music which 
uses ―plays4sure‖ DRM cannot play on the Microsoft Zune digital media player.  See Seán Byrne, Mi-
crosoft Postpones MSN Music DRM Server Shut-Off, CDFREAKS.COM, June, 19, 2008, 
http://www.myce.com/news/Microsoft-postpones-MSN-Music-DRM-server-shut-off-14762.  
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somewhat disastrous.310  To the extent that copyright owners have had any 
success with DRM, these successes look more like ―sufficient‖ control 
within the traditional contours of copyright law, not the Orwellian vision of 
a digital lockdown predicted over a decade ago.311  
DVDs and digital music notwithstanding, advances in the technologi-
cal protection of content have been overwhelmed by advances in the tech-
nologies of reproduction and distribution.  The proliferation of easy-to-copy 
content on the Internet has actually increased the economic significance of 
transaction costs.  The dominant transaction costs problem on the Internet 
relates to negotiating basic permissions for billions of pages, not sophisti-
cated bargaining over relatively few high volume items such as popular 
movies, books, and music.  Thus, while DRM technology may have the po-
tential to reduce transaction costs with respect to any one individual pre-
existing work, the magnitude of transactions that copy-reliant technologies 
must process has increased exponentially.  So, ironically, while Internet 
search engines have reduced transaction costs in relation to many copy-
righted markets, they themselves are subject to increasing transaction costs 
by virtue of their own success.  
The premillennial consensus that technology would reduce the signi-
ficance of transaction costs in relation to copyright failed to take into ac-
count the difference between the costs attending any one transaction and the 
total volume of transaction costs faced by copy-reliant technologies.  The 
adoption of new technologies has reduced the former, but not the latter.  
3. Collective Rights Management and Copy-Reliant Technologies.—
Collective management is the exercise of copyright and related rights by 
organizations acting on behalf of the owners of rights.312  In many intellec-
tual property contexts, transaction costs problems are addressed through 
collective rights management in the form of collection societies such as the 
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), or pa-
 
 
 
310
  See Megan M. LaBelle, The ―Rootkit Debacle‖: The Latest Chapter in the Story of the Record-
ing Industry and the War on Music Piracy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 81 (discussing consumer class ac-
tion lawsuits and law enforcement proceedings against Sony resulting from an attempt to prevent audio 
CD copying by consumers); J. Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM 
Episode, 15 USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 77 (2006), available at 
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm-ext.pdf; see generally R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to 
Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1015–16 
(2003) (arguing that there are very good reasons to doubt the meaningful impact of DRM anytime soon).  
311
  See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual Property Protection: 
Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the U.S. Copyright Act 24 (Columbia Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 07-137, 2007) (―To date, ‗digital lock-up‘ persists in spectral guise, a grim, yet un-
transpired, anticipation.‖). 
312
  See World Intellectual Property Organization, About WIPO, Collective Management of Copy-
right and Related Right, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/about_collective_mngt.html#P46_4989 (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2009). 
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tent pools and joint ventures, such as the 3G Patent Platform Partnership.313  
The success of collective rights management in some fields demonstrates 
that market based solutions can overcome high transaction costs in situa-
tions where the individual management of rights is impossible or impractic-
al.314  However, this particular type of private ordering solution may not be 
effective in relation to copy-reliant technologies because of the scale of 
transactions required and the decentralization and diversity of the relevant 
rights holders.  
The problem with collective rights management is that it has been most 
successful in the context of homogeneous transactions among repeat players 
with similar preferences.315  Collective rights management is unlikely to re-
duce the transaction costs faced by copy-reliant technologies.  First, copy-
reliant technologies typically rely on close to complete coverage—a search 
engine that only covers half the Internet is of very limited use.  This means 
that each html page is a complementary good, whereas collective rights or-
ganizations like ASCAP typically license a range of potential substitutes.  
Second, collective rights organizations like ASCAP only work because a 
significant percentage of relevant copyright owners affirmatively opt into 
that system.  Given the billions of works at issue and the hundreds of mil-
lions of rights owners involved, similar levels of participation seem unlike-
ly, at least for search engines.  On the other hand, it is actually somewhat 
surprising that high schools and universities have not established a centra-
lized body to facilitate plagiarism detection.  These institutions have a great 
interest in advancing plagiarism software and could easily make participa-
tion in an antiplagiarism database a condition of entry.  In this and other 
areas, even where the perquisites for effective collective rights management 
appear to exist, rights holders and the relevant intermediaries have been 
slow to take advantage of the potential savings collective action offers.316  
 
 
 
313
  3G Patent Platform Partnership is a standard setting organization designed to cap total fees paid 
to patentees that own rights in the 3G mobile phone standard.  See generally Reiko Aoki and Aaron 
Schiff, Promoting Access to Intellectual Property: Patent Pools, Copyright Collectives and Clearing-
houses. 38(2) R&D MANAGEMENT 189–204 (2008) (reviewing and comparing patent pools, intellectual 
property clearinghouses, and copyright collectives as alternative systems for promoting efficient access 
to licensable intellectual property).  
314
  Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1293–94 (1996).  But note that the continuing court super-
vision of ASCAP pursuant to an antitrust decree indicates that it is not the best example of a purely pri-
vate market solution.  See United States v. Am. Soc‘y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, No. 
Civ.A. 42-245, 1950 WL 42273, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1950). 
315
  Id. at 1319 (―Only repeated transactions among right holders will give rise to the private institu-
tions discussed . . . .  One-shot or sporadic interactions do not justify investments in exchange institu-
tions.‖). 
316
  See WILLIAM W. FISHER & WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, THE DIGITAL LEARNING CHALLENGE: 
OBSTACLES TO EDUCATIONAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL IN THE DIGITAL AGE 80 (2006) (not-
ing that there is a greater reluctance by rights holders regarding licensed digital uses of content as op-
posed to analog uses such as photocopies).  
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4. Private Ordering Through Opt-Outs.—It has been established thus 
far that transaction costs present a formidable potential obstacle to copy-
reliant technologies, one that is unlikely to be overcome by either DRM 
technology or collective rights management.  How then do copy-reliant 
technologies continue to function? The answer is that copy-reliant technol-
ogies typically rely on a combination of well understood default rules and 
technologically enabled opt-out mechanisms to reduce transaction costs.  
Grasping how these opt-out mechanisms work requires some (but not 
too much) understanding of the basic structure of the Internet.  The Internet 
is an open system that allows any endpoint (usually a computer) to commu-
nicate with any other endpoint through a set of standard protocols.317  The 
architecture of the Internet thus embeds a default rule of unrestricted access.  
This default requires anyone who does not wish their material to be availa-
ble to affirmatively opt out.  For example, website owners remain free to re-
strict access by blocking specific IP addresses, or by requiring a user 
account, a password, or both.  They can also control how search engines in-
teract with their copyrighted material by employing a technological device 
known as the Robots Exclusion Protocol.318  The default is, however, an 
open system.  
The Internet norm of open access stands in marked contrast to the 
usual assumptions made with respect to copyrighted works.  This norm has 
remained stable for some time for three reasons.  First, the initial design of 
the Internet and its basic protocol for the exchange of information embed-
ded an open architecture.319  The open, minimalist, and neutral design of 
TCP/IP has enabled an unparalleled diversity of social and technological 
innovations.320  Open systems and end-to-end architecture were fundamental 
early Internet technical standards.  The default of open access therefore con-
tinues, in part, simply as a result of path dependence.  Second, the norm of 
openness also continues to flourish because it reflects the preferences of the 
majority of Internet users.  Most people want their websites seen and their 
emails received.  Third, those with minority preferences generally have no 
quarrel with the default of open access; they simply opt out of the default as 
it suits them.  
 
 
 
317
  JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS 
WORLD 23 (2006). 
318
  See infra notes 320–324 and accompanying text.  
319
  See Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication, 
22(5) IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637, 637–48 (1974), available at http://www. 
cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/fall06/cos561/papers/cerf74.pdf (the original specification of the 
―Transmission Control Protocol‖); CHRISTOS J. P. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET: A 
CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE PRESENT 80–82 (1999) (an excerpt from a 1974 paper discussing the archi-
tecture of the Internet); GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 317, at 23. 
320
  TCP/IP stands for Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol.  Together, these two net-
working protocols largely control the movement of data across the Internet.  See GOLDSMITH & WU, su-
pra note 317, at 22–24.  
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This third point requires some elaboration.  Those with minority prefe-
rences can easily opt out of the default rules that govern the Internet in a 
number of ways, the most significant of which is probably the Robots Ex-
clusion Protocol.321  The Robots Exclusion Protocol is particularly signifi-
cant in the context of copy-reliant technology.  Every major Internet search 
engine relies on the Robots Exclusion Protocol to prevent their automated 
agents from indexing certain content and to remove previously indexed ma-
terial from their databases as required.  Although it has been widely 
adopted, the Robots Exclusion Protocol is not controlled by any standards 
setting organization and thus remains a de facto standard.  The success of 
the Robots Exclusion Protocol is attributable to two factors: its low cost and 
high degree of customization.  The monetary cost of using the Robots Ex-
clusion Protocol is zero and the information costs are not significantly high-
er.  Adding a robots.txt file to a website is trivial and there are a number of 
widely available free tools for automatically generating a robots.txt file.322  
To disallow all robots from a website simply requires two lines of code:  
User–Agent: * 
Disallow: /  
Adding these instructions to the robots.txt file at the root level of a 
website323 will block all compliant search engine robots and other informa-
tion harvesting software agents.324  As explained in section C below, soft-
ware architects who deliberately disregard the instructions contained in a 
robots.txt file and thus do not facilitate an opt-out regime will be less able 
to rely on a fair use defense than those who do.  
Apart from its low cost and relative simplicity, the real attraction of the 
Robots Exclusion Protocol is its extraordinary flexibility.  To block a par-
ticular directory rather than the entire site requires simply changing the 
second line to include the name of the directory.325  The Google search en-
gine, for example, is designed to allow site owners to prevent individual 
 
 
 
321
  In this context, a ―robot‖ is synonymous with a web crawler.  For a general discussion of the 
Robots Exclusion Protocol, see DAVID GOURLEY & BRIAN TOTTY, HTTP: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 225–
241 (2002).  See also The Web Robots Pages, About /robots.txt In a Nutshell, 
http://www.robotstxt.org/robotstxt.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).  The original Robots Exclusion Pro-
tocol was set out in 1994 by Martijn Koster.  See Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion 
(1994), available at http://www.robotstxt.org/orig.html.   
322
  The Web Robots Pages provides a tutorial on creating robots.txt files with a text editor.  See 
http://www.robotstxt.org.  Google offers a free robots.txt generator as part of their webmaster tools at 
http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=83098&topic=13648.  Microsoft‘s 
―How to Write a Robots.txt File‖ Knowledgebase article is available at http://support.microsoft.com/kb/ 
217103.  Other websites that provide additional tools include  http://robots.googletoad.com/ and 
http://www.seochat.com/seo-tools/robots-generator/.  
323
  For example: ―http://www.example.com/robots.txt.‖ 
324
  See TARA CALISHAIN & RAEL DORNFEST, GOOGLE HACKS: 100 INDUSTRIAL-STRENGTH TIPS & 
TOOLS 309 (2003); THOMAS A. POWELL, WEB DESIGN: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE 247–49 (2000). 
325
  For example: ―Disallow: /nameofdirectory/.‖  
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pages, sections of a website, or an entire website from being indexed.326  In 
the event that a website owner changes its preferences by activating the ro-
bots exclusion standard after Google has already indexed the content, the 
Google search engine will remove this content the next time Google 
―crawls‖ it.327  Google‘s implementation of the Robots Exclusion Protocol is 
also highly customizable: among other things, site owners can also remove 
either or both of the snippets and images that appear in the search results.328 
The important thing to realize about opt-out mechanisms such as the 
Robots Exclusion Protocol is that they do not displace private ordering—
they are the means of private ordering.  When transaction costs are other-
wise high, opt-out mechanisms can play a critical role in preserving a de-
fault rule of open access while still allowing individuals to have their 
preferences respected.  In the context of search engine technology, opt-out 
mechanisms such as the Robots Exclusion Protocol have reduced seemingly 
insurmountable transaction costs and made them manageable, if not trivi-
al.329  The Robots Exclusion Protocol and similar opt-outs do not actually 
clear rights in the sense of negotiating licenses, but they substitute for rights 
clearance where copyright owners would price access at zero—those who 
are not content with a zero price still retain the option to negotiate for some-
thing more than the default.  Field, Perfect 10, and Google Book are inter-
esting partly because the plaintiffs in those cases chose to object to the 
default rule instead of simply opting out.330  
B. Transaction Costs and Property Rights 
Critics of various copy-reliant technologies are quick to invoke the rhe-
toric of property in service of their claims.  Former Authors Guild president 
Nick Taylor is illustrative: he argues that Google is ―in effect, stealing 
people‘s property and providing others with access to it for its own gain.‖331  
The rallying cry of property rights here is more rhetorically than analytical-
ly useful.  When a new office building casts a shadow over a hotel swim-
ming pool or obstructs the air current so as to impede the operation of a 
windmill, it is pointless for the affected parties to simply proclaim their 
 
 
 
326
  See CALISHAIN & DORNFEST, supra note 324, at 315; Google, Removing My Own Content 
From Google's Index, http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=35301&topic 
=8459 (last visited July 29, 2009).  
327
  Google, supra note 326. 
328
  Id.   
329
  See John S. Sieman, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into Digital Copyright, 
85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 891 (2007) (―The transaction costs in getting permission before viewing every 
website would be so high that people would be likely to stop visiting websites.  An opt-in Internet would 
be virtually unusable.‖). 
330
  The motivations for this discontent are explored further in Part III.C.2, infra. 
331
  Nick Taylor, Letter from the President—Q4 2005, AUTHORS GUILD BULLETIN, Fall 2005, avail-
able at http://www.european-writers-congress.org/upload/312006102637.pdf at 14.  
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property rights are sacrosanct.332  The owners of the office building and the 
windmill each have property rights: the real question is what exactly is the 
content of those rights?  Whose rights prevail when owners assert conflict-
ing claims?  Both the doctrinal and welfare economics answers to this ques-
tion must be resolved with reference to transaction costs.  This section 
briefly summarizes some of the significant literature on transaction costs 
and explains why the mere assertion of ―property rights‖ does very little to 
tell us whether the rights of a copyright owner include the right not to allow 
copy-reliant technology to interact with her work. 
Transaction costs are central to an economic understanding of property 
rights because they dictate both the scope and the form of private rights.  
Private property generally reduces transaction costs by lowering the costs of 
coordination among disparate individuals.  Secure property rights are gen-
erally thought to be essential for the increased specialization that sustains 
economic development because they provide the institutional framework 
needed for long term and complex relationships.333  The allocation and defi-
nition of property rights determines both which individuals have the author-
ity to decide how a specific resource is used and to whom the costs and 
benefits of that use will flow.334  As every student of the Coase Theorem 
knows, in a world without transaction costs, the specific allocation of these 
costs and benefits is unimportant because all the relevant parties will bar-
gain to an efficient outcome regardless of their initial entitlement.335  How-
ever, as every student of the Coase Theorem also knows, in the real world, 
reallocation and enforcement are costly and many transaction costs persist.  
Indeed, because the specification of rights is itself a costly endeavor, it is 
axiomatic that rights will never be fully specified.336  
How then should property rights be allocated given that transaction 
costs abound?  One view is that, given transaction costs stand in the way of 
efficient reallocation, the primary objective of the law should be to reduce 
transaction costs by defining simple and clear property rights that enable 
private exchange.337  On this view, the law should not devote considerable 
resources to optimizing initial allocation; it should just ensure that all the 
rights worth specifying are allocated.338  A second view is that, because sub-
stantial transaction costs persist even after private rights have been allo-
 
 
 
332
  These examples come from R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960). 
333
  DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
33–35 (1990).  Property rights are but one element of the institutional matrix that sustains the rule of 
law.  
334
  NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO 
POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND 249 (2d ed. 2006). 
335
  Coase, supra note 332. 
336
  NORTH, supra note 333. 
337
  ROBERT COOTER & TOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 97 (4th ed. 2004). 
338
  See id. (―By lubricating bargaining, the law enables the private parties to exchange legal rights, 
thus relieving lawmakers of the difficult task of allocating legal rights efficiently.‖). 
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cated, lawmakers should allocate property rights to their best initial use so 
as to minimize the harm caused by inevitable failures to reach private 
agreements.339  
These contending implications of the Coase Theorem are frequently of-
fered as a binary choice.  Because the applicability of either depends on the 
exact nature of the transaction costs at issue, however, courts should accept 
neither prescription as dogma.  In fact, just as the decision of a firm to ei-
ther make or buy is determined by relative transaction costs, so too is the 
structure of property rights.340  In this context, it should be noted that the 
form that property rights take can play a significant role in reducing or ex-
acerbating transaction costs.  There is in consequence a vast legal literature 
devoted to understanding various features of different types of property as 
either attempts to perfect the initial allocation of rights or, more commonly, 
to reduce the transaction costs associated with those rights.341  
In contrast to contractual rights that bind only the parties to an agree-
ment, property creates rights against the whole world.  Thus, as Thomas 
Merrill and Henry Smith have argued, property rights attached to a ―thing‖ 
impose ―an informational burden‖ on all those who are likely to interact 
with that ―thing.‖342  Merrill and Smith argue further that the broad applica-
tion of the informational burden of property rights explains the tendency of 
these rights to come in a fixed menu of forms.  Thus, the law reduces trans-
action costs by limiting property rights to a set of standardized packages 
that the layperson can understand at low cost.343  
Consideration of information costs suggests a possible divergence be-
tween property in tangible and intangible objects—whereas physical prox-
imity limits the informational burden of tangible property, those same 
burdens can multiply almost infinitely in the case of intellectual property.  
Only those walking past Blackacre need to worry where its boundaries are; 
every musician in the world needs to worry that their new composition 
might have been inadvertently copied from any one of thousands of pop 
 
 
 
339
  See id. at 97–98 (discussing this theory as the ―Normative Hobbes Theorem‖). 
340
  See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (observing that 
differences in transaction costs explain variation in organizational hierarchy). 
341
  The classic work in this area being Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discuss-
ing the implications of transaction costs for different remedial structures). 
342
  Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 
111 YALE L.J. 357, 358–59 (2001); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Proper-
ty/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773  (2001) (explaining property and contract law in terms of 
the information costs of in rem and in personam rights); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3–9 (2000) 
(arguing that the standardized forms of property reduce transaction costs). 
343
  See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 342. 
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songs their brains have absorbed over the years.344  Another difference is al-
so worth noting: physical objects suggest at least a core definition congru-
ent with their physical attributes, whereas property rights in intangibles are 
purely a legal construct.345  In other words, while the rights attached to real 
property and chattels might be fuzzy at the edges, the ambiguity of rights 
attached to intangible expression is usually more pronounced.346  Accor-
dingly, the definition of intellectual property rights must be even more sen-
sitive to transaction costs—not just those between willing parties, but those 
imposed on the rest of the world.347  
Numerous legal commentators have offered transaction cost and in-
formation cost explanations for specific attributes of intellectual property 
law.  In The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, William 
Landes and Richard Posner explain a diverse range of intellectual property 
doctrines as efficient responses to transaction costs problems.  With respect 
to copyright, they argue that the need to keep transaction costs low explains 
the idea–expression distinction, the limited duration copyright, and the de-
rivative work right.348  In a more explicitly comparative vein, Clarisa Long 
argues that many differences between patent and copyright law stem from 
divergences in the information costs and coordination problems associated 
with expressive works and inventions.349  In a recent article, Henry Smith 
also applies information-cost theory to explain certain differences between 
copyright and patent law, arguing that the former is more like tort and the 
latter more like property.350  
Transaction costs are not only important in establishing certain features 
of copyright doctrine, an assessment of transaction costs is also a key inter-
nal feature of specific copyright doctrines, most notably fair use.  The cen-
 
 
 
344
  In one noteworthy case, George Harrison was found to have ―subconsciously plagiarized‖ the 
1963 hit He‘s So Fine in his 1970 single, My Sweet Lord.  See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs 
Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).  The alleged similarities escape this author. 
345
  See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 16 (2003) (noting that transaction costs tend to be higher in intellectual 
property as it is frequently difficult to identify such property because by definition it has no unique 
physical site). 
346
  As much was acknowledged by Judge Learned Hand when he said that ―as soon as literal appro-
priation ceases to be the test [for copyright infringement], the whole matter is necessarily at large.‖  Ni-
chols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
347
  See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 345, at 21 (concluding that intellectual property rights tend 
to be more costly than rights in physical property). 
348
  Id. at 21, 92–93, 111. 
349
  Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465 (2004). 
350
  Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 
116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007); see also Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 473 (2005) (justifying patent law based on private transaction costs savings rather than the more 
conventional incentive-based rationale); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liabil-
ity Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007) (making a transaction cost argument against 
the imposition of injunctions in cases where courts cannot easily tailor injunctions to forbid only the 
prohibited conduct). 
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tral purpose of the fair use doctrine is to permit certain uses that would oth-
erwise be infringing.  Indeed, as Wendy Gordon has shown, the presence of 
high transaction costs and other market failures provides a useful frame-
work for understanding the entirety of the fair use doctrine.351  Fair use 
plays a critical role where copyright owners attempt to use their rights to 
stifle criticism or prevent the articulation of contrary viewpoints.352  How-
ever, the doctrine is not limited to facilitating criticism and social debate.  
Fair use is necessary even when copyright owners are purely commercially 
motivated because licensing and other private ordering mechanisms do not 
provide a solution for cases involving high exchange costs, high informa-
tion costs, and strategic behavior.  As the market failure paradigm demon-
strates, the fair use doctrine is particularly important in situations where the 
costs of obtaining permission outweigh the benefits of the use.  Thus, ac-
cording to at least one court, the fair use doctrine protects book reviews be-
cause in the absence of a fair use doctrine, most publishers would disclaim 
control over the contents of reviews in any event.353  Consequently, the fair 
use doctrine economizes on transaction costs by making such disclaimers 
unnecessary.354  
While the role of fair use in addressing high costs of exchange is 
ground familiar to most copyright academics, the significance of fair use as 
a remedy to strategic behavior is less familiar.355  Law and economics scho-
lars are used to thinking about the implications of strategic behavior in di-
vided ownership contexts such as oil field unitization or corporate 
governance situations.356  The basic problem is that where several parties 
possess a veto right that can block some profitable enterprise—a new sta-
dium, oil well, or corporate merger—each has an incentive to ―hold out‖ for 
a disproportionate share of the gains to be had from that enterprise.  Both 
 
 
 
351
  Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Be-
tamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).  
352
  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (discussing parody as having 
social value); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing 
parody as entertainment and social and literary criticism). 
353
  Ty, Inc. v. Publ‘ns Int‘l, 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). 
354
  Id.  In this context, fair use could also be seen as the solution to a collective action problem be-
cause it allows publishers to credibly commit to not censoring reviews.  Landes and Posner explain the 
fair use status of book reviews in terms of implied consent, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 345, at 120–
22, but collective action and credible commitment are more convincing explanations.   
355
  See Sag, supra note 29, at 250 (criticizing doctrinal recommendations which aim to optimize 
copyright scope in the abstract but do not account for the effect of uncertainty or strategic behavior). 
356
  See Zohar Goshen, Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 815, 
820 (2001) (explaining the holdout problem in the corporate governance setting); Gary D. Libecap & 
James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 589 (2002); George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, Asymmetric Information Bargain-
ing Problems with Many Agents, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 351, 351 (1990) (citing examples such as ―oil 
field unitization, . . . a group of workers deciding on whether to leave their firm and establish a new ven-
ture . . ., [and] the construction of a production facility generating pollution‖).  
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experience and theory suggest that the mere presence of a divisible surplus 
does not ensure that the parties will in fact agree on how that division 
should proceed.357  Furthermore, agreements on division are constrained by 
the costs of enforcement given that once a deal has been reached, 
―[a]ccording to a strictly wealth-maximizing behavioral assumptions, a par-
ty to exchange will cheat, steal, or lie when the payoff to such activity ex-
ceeds the value of the alternative opportunities available to the party.‖358  
The problems attending strategic behavior are particularly relevant to 
copyright because all copyrighted works build on previous works to some 
extent.  Musicians attempting to clear samples can face license demands 
from the original copyright owners that effectively seek to expropriate the 
entire value of the newly created work.359  Strategic behavior may prevent 
parties who would otherwise have much to gain from cooperating if mul-
tiple clearances are required, because it is quite rational for the players to 
adopt strategies that risk destroying the surplus in order to gain a larger 
share.360  Even nonstrategic parties sometimes cause holdout problems be-
cause of the divergent valuations that result from egotism and other cogni-
tive biases.361  The fair use doctrine reduces transaction costs associated 
with strategic behavior by eliminating the holdout power of the copyright 
owner in situations where her contribution is comparatively small to that of 
the defendant, or where some degree of copyright owner intransigence is ef-
fectively presumed.  
The salient point is that the invocation of the property mantra does 
very little to tell us whether the rights of a copyright owner include the right 
not to allow copy-reliant technology to interact with her work.362  A further 
important point remains: even if that issue is resolved in the copyright own-
er‘s favor, the form of that property right still remains an open question.  It 
is not enough to simply determine the appropriate ―property rules,‖ ―liabili-
 
 
 
357
  See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1982) (arguing that disagree-
ments as to how to divide the contractual surplus may prevent successful Coasean bargaining); see also 
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (arguing that underuse results when too many owners hold rights of ex-
clusion in a single resource). 
358
  NORTH, supra note 333, at 30.  
359
  See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS: REVISED 
AND UPDATED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 306–08 (Simon & Schuster 2000) (1991); Ross, supra note 108, 
at 282–83 (discussing the costs of licensing fees of nonparody sampling in rap and hip hop music as 
prohibitively high for all but ―established artists and the media Goliaths‖). 
360
  Robert Cooter & Steven Marks with Robert N. Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 225, 243 (1982) (arguing that private bargain-
ing to redistribute external costs will not achieve efficiency unless there is an institutional mechanism to 
dictate the terms of the contract for dividing the stakes).  
361
  Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking 
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 89 (1994). 
362
  Oren Bracha makes a similar point in relation to Google Book.  See Bracha, supra note 2.  
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ty rules,‖ and ―inalienability rules.‖363  Even if we accept that the copyright 
owners‘ rights are to be protected by a veto right (i.e., a property rule), the 
question remains: under what conditions, if any, can this right be exercised?  
As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky observe in their own memor-
able phrasing, entitlements are often dynamic in nature and ―pliability‖ 
rules—contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner with either prop-
erty rule or liability rule protection as long as some specified condition ob-
tains—are quite common.364  
The notion that the rights of the property owner can be protected under 
permissive default rules coupled with an opt-out is hardly new.  Robert El-
lickson famously describes the ―fencing out‖ rule whereby cattle were al-
lowed to roam freely on the property of others unless that property was 
fenced.365  Landowners still maintained their property rights, subject to the 
burden of fencing out neighbors‘ cattle.  Presumably, if cattle could read, a 
sign not unlike the Robots Exclusion Protocol would have been sufficient.  
Cattle are just one example.  Indeed, beneath the visage of ―property,‖ one 
sees a variegated landscape with rules tailored according to the differences 
between rights in Blackacre, animals (wild and domestic), oil and gas, wa-
ter rights (subject to multiple regimes depending on geography and land 
use), and air rights.366  Specifically in relation to copyright, the suggestion 
that authors should be required to accept some cost before vindicating their 
rights is not unprecedented.  As Michael Mattioli perceptively notes, ―while 
formal registration and deposit are no longer strict requirements for copy-
rightability, both are demanded of authors who wish to bring infringement 
suits.‖367 
Although copyright is primarily a system of property rights, it has no 
uniform or immutable character.  Just as the invocation of the property does 
not settle disputes over the scope of rights, it is also inconclusive as to the 
form of those rights.  The centrality of transaction costs in modern property 
theory and the practical importance of opt-out mechanisms in reducing 
 
 
 
363
  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 341.  
364
  Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (com-
menting on Calabresi and Melamed‘s methods).  
365
  See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
76 (1991).  But note that here norms appeared to govern behavior regardless of the underlying law. 
366
  Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 
804–05 (2001).  The Illinois Right of Publicity Act contains a special provision allowing professional 
photographers to exhibit photos which might otherwise infringe upon a person‘s right of publicity ―un-
less the exhibition is continued by the professional photographer after written notice objecting to the ex-
hibition has been given by the individual portrayed.‖  See Illinois Right of Publicity Act, 765 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 1075/35(b)(5) (2009). 
367
  Michael R. Mattioli, Opting Out: Procedural Fair Use, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20–21 (2007); 
see also 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (2006) (―[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United 
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim . . . .‖); id. § 412 
(precluding statutory damages for infringements before the effective date of registration in many cir-
cumstances). 
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transaction costs for copy-reliant technologies make some analysis of the 
doctrinal implications of opt-out mechanisms essential.  As in many other 
cases, the fair use doctrine provides the most natural framework for that 
analysis.  The next section specifically addresses this question.  
C. The Significance of Opt-Outs in Fair Use Analysis 
1. The ―Purpose and Character‖ of Opt-Outs.—Assessing the relev- 
ance of an opt-out mechanism to the first statutory fair use factor—the 
―purpose and character of the use‖368—requires some determination of what 
types of uses should be preferred.  The Copyright Act itself is not particu-
larly instructive as to what uses should be preferred under this factor, thus 
courts must inevitably revert to the fundamental principles of copyright law 
itself.369  
As discussed at length in Part II, one of these principles is that acts of 
copying that do not communicate the author‘s original expression to the 
public should generally not be held to constitute copyright infringement.  
This follows from the essential observation that the purpose of copyright is 
to protect authors from the unfairness of having their own original expres-
sion used in competition against them as a substitute for their work.  Al-
though the Supreme Court‘s most recent guidance stresses the question of 
transformativeness,370 the transformative use doctrine is but one manifesta-
tion of the broader principle of expressive substitution.  
In addition to this core concept of expressive substitution, courts 
should also consider institutional design of copyright.  Copyright achieves 
its constitutional purpose—the promotion of progress in science and useful 
arts—―[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of one‘s expres-
sion‖;371 this marketability not only encourages authorship, it decouples au-
thorship from the corrupting influences of state subsidy and elite 
patronage.372  Copyright is not the only way to encourage authorship; a sys-
tem of state prizes might do that just as well.373  The advantage of copyright 
over other systems is that it not only encourages authorship, it also gives 
authors a degree of autonomy.  Accordingly, when evaluating a claim of 
fair use, courts should consider to what extent the defendant‘s conduct as a 
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  17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006). 
369
  Sag, supra note 4, at 385.  
370
  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Leval, supra note 
215, at 1111. 
371
  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). 
372
  Netanel, supra note 231, at 288. 
373
  See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 
44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) (concluding that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental 
social advantage over reward systems and that an optional reward system—under which innovators 
choose between rewards and intellectual property rights—is superior to intellectual property rights). 
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whole undermines or enhances the autonomy not just of the author in the 
case, but of the class of authors the decision will affect.  Put another way, 
when in doubt, courts should attempt to maximize choice by setting default 
rules that reduce transaction costs.  In this context, the effect of opt-out me-
chanisms moves from the periphery of the fair use question to center stage.  
Once judges appreciate that legal rules establish default positions 
which are then subject to modification, the effect of opt-out mechanisms 
becomes a significant consideration in fair use cases.  A finding of fair use 
conditioned on the existence of a low cost opt-out mechanism poses far less 
risk to the autonomy of the author than a finding of fair use with no such 
mechanism.  Furthermore, such a finding may be the only way to overcome 
certain information asymmetries and problems associated with strategic be-
havior.   
Consider the following scenario.  Assume that the majority of authors 
would actually benefit from the defendant‘s proposed use, but that a minori-
ty objects.  Assume further that the cost of affirmatively clearing rights for 
the defendant is very high but the cost of taking advantage of the opt-out 
mechanism provided by the defendant is very low.374  In this situation, if the 
court determines that the defendant‘s use is fair, the majority‘s preferences 
are satisfied and the minority must either tolerate the defendant‘s use or ne-
gotiate with the defendant to abate the use.  This is not a common outcome 
in copyright; in most situations, it is unreasonable to expect that copyright 
owners would be able to contract around a default of permission given the 
multiplicity of potential users they would have to deal with.375  If the court 
determines that the defendant‘s use is fair subject to an opt-out, the majori-
ty‘s preferences are satisfied and the minority must either tolerate the de-
fendant‘s use or incur the cost of the opt-out in order to have their 
preferences satisfied.  Under our assumption that the cost of the opt-out is 
relatively low, the autonomy of the majority and the minority is preserved, 
subject only to the cost of opting out.  Finally, if the court determines that 
the defendant‘s use is unfair, then the majority must bear the burden of opt-
ing in.  The cost of opting in might be especially high.  This could be be-
cause of coordination problems in situations where the use requires a 
critical mass, or where copyright owners simply lack information about the 
needs of potential users.  If the cost of opting in is effectively preclusive, a 
denial of fair use will bind the majority to the will of the minority.  On the 
other hand, if the cost of opting in is de minimis, both the majority and the 
minority will have their preferences respected.  From an economic perspec-
tive, the efficiency of an opt-in versus an opt-out system will depend on the 
 
 
 
374
  Note that the copyright owner‘s monitoring costs are a significant element of the cost of the opt-
out; accordingly, for this scenario to be true, monitoring costs must also be very small.  
375
  The inability of the copyright owner to buy the silence of her critics is of course desirable in 
many cases where the fair use in question takes the form of political or social commentary. 
103:1607  (2009) Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology 
 1677 
ratio of those who prefer inclusion to those who do not, and on the compar-
ative costs of opting in versus opting out.   
Field v. Google illustrates the particular relevance of these criteria to 
copy-reliant technologies.376  In the Field case, as in many copy-reliant 
technology cases, taking advantage of the opt-out mechanism was virtually 
costless.  Indeed, the district court found that disabling the cache functional-
ity for any of the pages on Field‘s website would have taken him ―a matter 
of seconds.‖377  The legal significance of this finding tied directly to the 
question of autonomy.  In the court‘s view, given the easy availability of the 
opt-out mechanism, it was in fact the plaintiff copyright owner—and not 
Google—who effectively controlled whether cached links would appear in 
relation to his web pages.378  Thus, by placing control in the hands of site 
owners, the ―character and purpose‖ of Google‘s use of the copyrighted ma-
terial was not unfair.  Field also illustrates the evidentiary value of an estab-
lished opt-out mechanism where the copyright owner claims that although 
the use in question may appear to be nonexpressive, it nonetheless poses 
some hypothetical danger of expressive substitution.  As the Field court ob-
served, ―[t]he fact that the owners of billions of Web pages choose to permit 
these links to remain is further evidence that they do not view Google‘s 
cache as a substitute for their own pages.‖379  In other words, the presumed 
acquiescence of a large number of copyright owners who could very inex-
pensively opt-out indicates that expressive substitution is unlikely.  
In sum, the relevance of the existence of a low cost opt-out mechanism 
to the first fair use factor is that it affects the purpose and character of the 
defendant‘s use in certain situations.  Courts should consider whether (1) 
the defendant‘s proposed use is one which the majority of affected copy-
right owners would actually favor; (2) the costs of taking advantage of the 
opt-out are sufficiently small such that the autonomy of the minority is pre-
served; and (3) the costs of opting in would be high enough to threaten the 
autonomy of the majority under an opt-in rule.  Under these circumstances, 
allowing the defendant to proceed subject to an opt-out will significantly 
reduce transaction costs, thus benefiting the defendant and a majority of af-
fected copyright owners while preserving the autonomy of the minority.  In 
choosing rules that facilitate private ordering through opt-outs, judges can 
stay true to copyright‘s basic design by maintaining the autonomy of the au-
thor and allowing breathing space for later generations to make their own 
contributions.  
2. The Market Effect of Opt-Outs.—The presence of an opt-out mec- 
hanism is also potentially relevant under the fourth fair use factor, ―the ef-
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  Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
377
  Id. at 1119. 
378
  Id. 
379
  Id.  The court further remarked that ―Google‘s alleged copying and distribution of Field‘s Web 
pages containing copyrighted works was transformative.‖  Id.  
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fect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.‖380  The primary considerations here are similar to those stated above.  
If the cost of taking advantage of an opt-out mechanism provided by the de-
fendant is very low, then it is hard to see how a finding of fair use subject to 
an opt-out could have a harmful effect on the ―potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.‖381  Indeed, it seems strange at first blush that any 
copyright owner would bother to object to a permissive default coupled 
with an opt-out rather than simply exercising the opt-out in this scenario.  
There is, however, a logical explanation for such behavior.  A rational 
copyright owner will insist on a veto right rather than the right to opt-out 
under either one of two conditions: (1) where the expected costs of obtain-
ing and exercising a veto are lower than the expected costs of taking advan-
tage of the equivalent opt-out; or (2) where the expected benefits of 
exercising a veto are greater than those that can be obtained by merely opt-
ing out. 
The first condition is easily illustrated.  It would, for example, place an 
intolerable burden on the average mystery writer if she had to affirmatively 
tell each publisher in the United States that she did not wish them to publish 
her manuscript.382  In that case, the expected costs of a veto over publication 
are substantially lower than the costs of an alternative opt-out regime.  In 
the context of copy-reliant technology, however, the opposite may hold 
true.  For example, the average burden of the opt-out default policed by the 
Robots Exclusion Protocol is extremely slight because the copyright owner 
need only attach one notice to communicate to all comers.  
The second condition in which a copyright owner would insist on a ve-
to right rather than the right to opt-out is where the benefits of exercising a 
veto are greater than those that can be obtained by merely opting out.  This 
condition can be met, as the Perfect 10 case illustrates, where the right to 
opt-out is ineffective because the copyright owner has lost control of the 
uses of her works by infringing third parties.383  Perfect 10 both benefits 
from and is a victim of the open end-to-end architecture of the Internet.  
The openness of the Internet gives Perfect 10 access to an enormous market 
unconstrained by geography and zoning laws—the latter being especially 
important to the ―adult‖ content market.  However, the openness of the In-
ternet also enables third parties to infringe Perfect 10‘s copyrights in ways 
that can be hard to detect or enforce.  By employing certain technical devic-
es, Perfect 10 has opted out of inclusion in image-based search engines but 
elected to remain visible to traditional text-oriented searches.384  In this way, 
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  17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006). 
381
  Id. 
382
  Of course, the © and ―all rights reserved‖ notices serve this function as well.  
383
  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725–29 (9th Cir. 2007). 
384
  The Perfect 10 website also remains accessible through the Internet Archive‘s Wayback Ma-
chine.  
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Perfect 10 is a direct beneficiary of default rules and opt-out mechanisms 
that prevail on the Internet vis-à-vis traditional search engines.  Nonethe-
less, in a series of court battles, Perfect 10 has chosen to attack this same in-
stitutional setup in relation to image-based searching.  The reason is simple: 
for Perfect 10, opting out of image-based searching is ineffective because it 
has not been able to prevent third parties from infringing its works.  Perfect 
10 thus illustrates the problem of a minority holdout to a transaction-cost-
reducing mechanism.  The decision for the court in this case was to deter-
mine how the benefits of the default of inclusion weighed against the costs 
imposed on minorities such as Perfect 10.  By suing Google rather than the 
websites that illegally hosted its photos, Perfect 10 was effectively asking 
the court to shift the costs of copyright enforcement onto Google and the 
public at large, which benefits from image-based searching.  Seen in this 
light, the court‘s conclusion that the benefits of the open default outweighed 
the limited costs to Perfect 10 is quite understandable.385  
The second condition can also be met, as the Field case illustrates, 
where the copyright owner believes that she can strategically use a veto 
right to extract some of the surplus value in a joint enterprise contributed by 
authors who consent to the use of their works or the independent investment 
of the defendant.386  The trial court found that Field had no genuine objec-
tion to the default rules and opt-out mechanisms that prevail on the Internet.  
Indeed, by his own admission, Field‘s objection was purely a strategic at-
tempt to extract rents from Google.387  Field argued that Google‘s caching 
functionality harmed the market for his works by depriving him of revenue 
he could have obtained by charging Google for the right to present caches 
of his web pages.  The court rejected this transparently circular argument, 
noting that ―the fourth fair use factor is not concerned with such syllog-
isms.‖388  As discussed in Part II, courts limit the potential circularity of the 
fourth factor by limiting the market for potential derivative uses in a num-
ber of ways.  The reason that the court excluded the copyright owner‘s 
bootstrapping claim of a market effect in this case was that he was not seek-
ing to extract the value that Google derived from access to his works—
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  See 487 F.3d at 725 (―Google has put Perfect 10‘s thumbnail images (along with millions of oth-
er thumbnail images) to a use fundamentally different than the use intended by Perfect 10.  In doing so, 
Google has provided a significant benefit to the public.‖). 
386
  See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 2006). 
387
  Id. at 1113 (―Field decided to manufacture a claim for copyright infringement against Google in 
the hopes of making money from Google‘s standard practice.‖).  It should be noted that even if Google 
had not prevailed on the issue of fair use, the result in this particular case would have been unchanged 
because Field‘s invitation to Google‘s search robots amounted to an implied license.  
388
  Id. at 1121 n.9 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994)); see al-
so Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘n. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1378 n.25 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995) (―[T]here could hardly be a market for licensing the temporary copying of digital works onto 
computer screens to allow browsing.‖); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 
2003) (noting that ―Mattel was unlikely to develop or license others to develop a product in the ‗adult‘ 
doll market‖). 
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which was almost certainly nil.  Instead, he was attempting to extract value 
based on the permission costs he could impose on Google in relation to oth-
er copyright owners.  
The Field case raises an issue of more general application: How should 
courts treat strategic rent seekers in copyright disputes?  In the ordinary 
course, a copyright owner should be entitled to hold out for whatever she 
thinks the use of her particular work is worth.  That kind of rent seeking is 
the mechanism through which copyright provides an incentive to creativity 
in the first place.  However, in the context of copy-reliant technologies at 
least, courts should be disinclined to allow one copyright owner to expro-
priate the value added by other copyright owners.  A copyright owner might 
argue that the effect of one copyright owner‘s veto on other copyright own-
ers is irrelevant to the fourth factor because the particular language of the 
statute refers to ―the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.‖389  However, such a narrow reading of the fourth 
factor is unsustainable in light of the purpose and structure of copyright 
law.  
To begin with, the very nature of common law adjudication demands 
that courts consider the welfare of copyright owners beyond the plaintiff.  
Litigated cases not only settle disputes between parties, they also set rules 
and precedents that extend far beyond the specific parties to the litigation.  
Courts should therefore consider the likely market effect of their decisions 
on copyright owners generally, not merely on the particular plaintiff before 
them;390 in doing so they are more likely to set beneficial precedents of gen-
eral application.  The Supreme Court‘s admonition in Campbell—to con-
sider the four statutory factors in light of the purposes of copyright—also 
requires courts to consider their decisions in light of their more general ef-
fect on the progress of science and useful arts.391  
The second reason that courts should consider the welfare of copyright 
owners beyond the plaintiff relates back to the role of autonomy in copy-
right law.  As discussed, copyright achieves its constitutional purpose—the 
promotion of progress in science and useful arts—by establishing a market-
able right to an original expression.392  The author‘s marketable right in her 
expression is not merely an instrument of incentive; it is also an instrument 
of autonomy because it leaves the author free to choose her own path, one 
that is significantly less reliant on state or elite subsidy.  If the autonomy of 
the author is a freestanding policy goal of the copyright system, then the ef-
fect of default rules on autonomy must be considered under the fourth fac-
tor.  In a scenario where the majority of copyright owners would consent to 
inclusion and the costs of individualized permission are much greater than 
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  17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006). 
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  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
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  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78. 
392
  See supra notes 230–231 and accompanying text.  
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the costs of opting out, the failure of a court to find fair use may effectively 
bind the majority to the will of the minority.  While this is by no means 
preclusive of a finding against fair use, it is clearly a significant considera-
tion under the fourth factor.  
 
 * * * 
 
A combination of permissive defaults and opt-out mechanisms is a 
common feature of copy-reliant technology.  As this Article has shown, it is 
often critical for copy-reliant technologies to mitigate otherwise prohibitive 
transaction costs through opt-outs.  Critics of particular copy-reliant tech-
nologies may argue that the use of opt-outs is irrelevant to the fair use anal-
ysis.393  This Article takes the contrary position.  A dogmatic insistence that 
literary property extends to every conceivable use of the author‘s work is 
both inaccurate as a description of settled law and unhelpful in the context 
of novel questions at the fringe of copyright law.  The Copyright Act itself 
requires courts to determine the content and form of the rights of authors in 
response to new developments, and the fair use doctrine acts as an instru-
ment of policy delegation in that regard.  As this Part has shown, the central 
role of transaction costs in defining the scope and content of property rights 
and the specific statutory factors of the fair use doctrine each suggest that 
the defendant‘s compliance with a low cost opt-out regime must be a signif-
icant factor in this analysis.  
CONCLUSION  
In many ways, technology is the dog on copyright‘s leash.  In theory, 
and occasionally in practice, copyright channels the direction of technologi-
cal progress.  But, more often, technology simply drags the law in its wake, 
going where it will.  This Article has demonstrated the pull of recent tech-
nological change on copyright law.  Copy-reliant technologies—
technologies that necessarily copy expressive works in large quantities, but 
do so for nonexpressive purposes—are vital to the operation of the Internet.  
And yet, because these technologies are so dependent on access to copy-
righted works, they are also vulnerable to claims of copyright infringement.  
An exploration of the common ground shared by search engines, elec-
tronic archives, plagiarism detection software, and other copy-reliant tech-
nologies sheds considerable light on the application of copyright law in the 
Internet era.  The mere fact that common ground exists does not suggest 
that the copyright issues affecting these technologies must necessarily be 
resolved uniformly.  There are also significant differences between the 
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  See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google‘s Plan to Make the World‘s Collection of 
Books Searchable, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1, 67 (2006) (doubting the validity of the opt-
out argument).  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1682 
copy-reliant technologies surveyed in this Article.  In relation to the first 
core question posed by copy-reliant technology—the potential for copyright 
liability for the expressive use of copyrighted works—this Article has es-
tablished that acts of copying which do not communicate the author‘s origi-
nal expression to the public should not generally be held to constitute copy-
copyright infringement.  In relation to traditional copyright subject matter at 
least, to do so would conflict with decades of accumulated precedent that 
limit the rights of copyright owners to those uses of their works that offer 
some threat of expressive substitution.  
In spite of its centrality, the question of nonexpressive use may not ful-
ly resolve all copyright disputes involving copy-reliant technologies.  In-
evitably, courts will face cases where the line between expressive and 
nonexpressive use remains ambiguous.  In many such cases, the effect of 
opt-out mechanisms offered by the defendant moves from the periphery to 
the center of legal analysis.  Technologically enabled opt-out mechanisms 
such as the Robots Exclusion Protocol help maintain order on the digital 
frontier.  Such devices can play an essential role in overcoming the other-
wise daunting transaction costs facing copy-reliant technologies.  Accor-
dingly, to treat the phenomenon of copy-reliant technology 
comprehensively requires addressing the significance of opt-out mechan-
isms under copyright law.   
Copyright law is fluid by design, and nowhere is that fluidity more 
evident than in the development of the fair use doctrine.  The fair use doc-
trine both allows and requires judges to consider market realities in deter-
mining the application of copyright law in novel circumstances.  To the 
extent that other commentators have considered the doctrinal significance 
of transaction costs in relation to isolated issues such as the Google Book 
project, they have largely missed the point.  Judges are not state planners; 
they should not attempt to use the fair use doctrine to achieve some static 
allocation of uses for a given set of copyrighted works.  What judges should 
do is apply the fair use doctrine to fashion a set of default rules: these de-
fault rules should encompass the distinction between expressive and nonex-
pressive uses articulated in this Article; they should also take into account 
the role of transaction costs and facilitate the kind of private ordering that 
copyright has traditionally embraced.  
 
 
 
